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LEARNING NEUROSCIENCE
THE HARD WAY:
THE TERRI SCHIAVO CASE AND THE
ETHICS OF EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
Robert A. Destro*t
"It has been said innumerable times, and I have also
repeated it, that 'facts remain and theories pass away...
To observe without thinking is as dangerous as to think without
observing. "'
"These results confirm that, despite fulfilling the clinical
criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state, this patient retained
the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to
* Professor of Law & Director, Interdisciplinary Program in Law & Religion, Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America. Parts of this article are revised and
rewritten from Charles A. Erin & Suzanne Ost, eds., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
HEALTH CARE (Oxford University Press 2007): Chapter 8, Robert A. Destro, Lessons in
Legal and Judicial Ethics from Schiavo: The Special Responsibilities of Lawyers and
Judges in Cases Involving Persons with Severe Cognitive Disabilities, and are used by
permission of Oxford University Press. I would like to thank Dr. Erin and Dr. Ost for
inviting me to contribute to that volume. That invitation encouraged me to collect many
of the thoughts and observations developed during my involvement in the Schiavo case
from August 2004 through March 2005. I also thank Oxford University Press
(www.oup.com), which has granted "Free permission Author's own material" for the
material that appears in the Erin & Ost volume. Additional acknowledgments appear in
the endnote on page 903.
1 Alvaro Fernandez, Comment, Santiago Ramon y Cajal: Recollections of My Life,
SHARP BRAINS, Aug. 31, 2008, http://www.sharpbrains.comfblog/2008/08/31/santiago-
ramon-y-cajal-recollections-of-my-life/ (quoting SANTIAGO RAMON Y CAJAL,
RECOLLECTIONS OF MY LIFE 638 (E. Horne Craigie & Juan Cano trans., First MIT Press
3d ed. 1996).
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them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or
movement. "
In re Guardianship of Schiavo' is one of the most notable,
complex, and cautionary controversies in American legal and
political history. It began in the early 1990s when Terri Schiavo
suffered a massive brain injury after a cardio-respiratory failure
of indeterminate origin. It ended when she died from marked
dehydration4 after a Florida court ordered her guardian to
remove her feeding tubes and to withhold all further nutrition
and hydration. The political power struggle it ignited between
the Florida and federal courts and the elected branches of the
Florida and federal governments held the nation and the world
transfixed for weeks.
The recent case of Eluana Englaro, described by one
commentator as "[t]he Complicated Case of [the] 'Italian Terri
Schiavo,"'5 has had an equally unsettling effect on the Italian
people and their government. Eluana's case began when she
suffered a traumatic brain injury (TBI) in a 1992 automobile
accident. It ended in March 2009, when an Italian court
2 Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCI. 1402
(Sept. 8, 2006).
3 In Re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), affd
without opinion, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001).
4 JON R. THOGMARTIN, M.D. ET AL., REPORT OF AUTOPSY: THERESA SCHIAVO, CASE
No. 5050439 (June 13, 2005), at 8, Question 7 ("By what mechanism did Theresa Schiavo
die?"). Because the Medical Examiner could not determine the cause of the "severe
anoxic brain injury .. .with reasonable medical certainty[, the] manner of death will
therefore be certified as undetermined." Id. at 9, Question 8 ("What was the cause and
manner of death?").
5 See, e.g., Peter Parisius, The Complicated Case of "Italian Terri Schiavo," THE
ITALY DISPATCH, Dec. 25, 2008, available at
http://italydispatch.splinder.com/post/19415896The+complicated+case+of+%22Itali. See
also Gina Doggett, Uproar in Italy Over Mercy Killing, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Australia), Feb. 8, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 2450460; News International Ltd.,
Coma Woman Dies According to Her Wish' Before Parliament Can Restore Life Support,
THE TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 10, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 2595132. Cf. Benedetta
Argentieri, Eluana, pie di diecimila in corteo Appello dalla Cattolica: ora rispetto
[Eluana: More than 10,000 March from the Catholic University of Milan], CORRIERE
DELLA SERA (Milan, Italy), Feb. 8, 2009, at 9, available at 2009 WLNR 2471340
(reporting that Italian Undersecretary of Health, Eugenia Roccella, sought to assure the
crowd that 'The Englaro case is not this country's Terri Schiavo case.").
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authorized her father to withhold nutrition and hydration.
Based on the press accounts of the case to date, it is safe to
assume that her case will shape the thinking of Italians on these
issues for many years to come.
At last count, over 17,000 English-language articles discuss
the legal, medical, political, medical ethics, and cultural
dimensions of the Schiavo case.6  Only a few discuss the
bewildering complexity of its facts, or seek to place them in the
scientific, medical, or cultural context of the 1990s in which the
Schiavo and Englaro cases arose. None of them discuss the
ethical obligations of the lawyers and judges whose professional
obligations serve as the protections-of-last-resort for the
interests and human dignity of persons whose cognitive abilities
have been impaired or destroyed by disease, stroke, or a
traumatic brain injury (TBI).7
This article seeks to fill that void by looking at some of the
lessons that can be learned from a critical examination of the
Schiavo case through the lens of legal ethics. This is a subject
on which I can claim some unique knowledge. In Schiavo v.
Bush,' I argued the case for the constitutionality of the executive
review process established by the Florida legislature after Judge
6 A full-text search on the phrase 'Terri Schiavo" in Academic Search Premier
produced 17,738 English language references. Of this number, 9,043 appeared in
academic journals, including some law reviews. A Westlaw search on the same phrase
returned 525 references in law reviews and legal periodicals, and a LEXIS search of law
reviews, legal periodicals, and CLE materials produced 369. This is understandable.
The case fits comfortably within the intersecting boundaries of civil and criminal
procedure; the law of homicide; family, guardianship, and disability law; the art and
science of medicine; neuroscience; professional ethics; constitutional law; politics; and
morals.
7 A full-text search on the phrase 'Terri Schiavo" & "Rule 1.14" produced five
references in LEXIS and eight in Westlaw. Most of these dealt with issues of disability
and incompetence in the context of estate planning. See, e.g., Michael D. Toobin,
Considerations in Planning for Incapacity, NATIONAL BUSINESS INSTITUTE: ESTATE
PLANNING BASICS (2008), available at 42293 NBI-CLE 99. The only article that came
close to addressing this topic was that of Professor Pamela Champine. See Pamela
Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL.
L. REV. 25, 26 (2006) (comparing the problem facing courts that must decide whether a
testator lacks mental capacity to the situation in which the "fallibility of medical
expertise requires individuals to exercise judgment about when to trust their own
instincts and when to rely on professional medical advice").
8 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005).
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Greer's September 17, 2003, order that Terri Schiavo's feeding
tube be withdrawn. 9 "Terri's Law"10 authorized Governor Jeb
Bush to issue a stay of execution of the probate court's order,
and to seek the appointment of a court-appointed guardian ad
litem who would to review the record in the proceedings before
Judge Greer and report back to the Governor and the court."
That stay was embodied in an October 2003 Executive Order to
sustain Terri Schiavo's life during the pendency of the review
process.12  I later served as co-counsel on the legal team
representing the Schindler family, and wrote the initial
justification for a proposed amendment to the federal habeas
corpus statute13 that would have given Terri access to the great
writ. Public Law 109-3 emerged from that process.
1 4
9 See infra text accompanying note 131.
10 2003 Fla. Laws 418, available at http:/flaws.flrules.org/files/Ch.2003-418.pdf.
11 The Florida Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Bush v. Schiavo on August
31, 2004. The transcript of the oral argument is available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel]transcript/04-925.htm. The video is available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/04-08.html. My co-counsel in the case,
Kenneth J. Connor, Esq., argued the proposition that neither the passage of Terri's Law,
nor the Governor's assertion of protective custody, violated the terms of Judge Greer's
September 17, 2003, order.
12 Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/schiavo/flagovexord03201.html. Given the interests
at stake, the only way to accomplish that end was to insert a new nutrition and
hydration tube.
13 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2007). The goal of that amendment would have been to make
it clear that persons in Terri's situation were persons "in custody." See, e.g.,
Memorandum of March 6, 2005 from Robert A. Destro to Brian Darling, "Proposed
Habeas Amendments regarding Terri Schiavo case" at 1 3 (on file with author) ("In
sum, if Terri Schiavo's case is not appropriate for habeas corpus, it is hard to figure out
what cases might be. Ted Bundy got better process than she did.").
14 Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15
(2005). The legislative saga is just as interesting as the history of the intra-family
dispute that sparked this litigation, the history of the litigation itself, and the history of
the tantalizing, but ultimately unsuccessful, last-ditch efforts to have Terri Schiavo's
consciousness disorder evaluated by two of the world's leading experts in the field.
Space limitations and relevancy concerns make it impossible to recount that story here,
but it is a story worth telling, especially the part that deals with the extensive
negotiations held between the House of Representatives and the Senate that led to the
framing of Public Law Number 109-3 as a special bill for the relief of Terri Schiavo's
family rather than a one-line amendment to the habeas corpus statute. Pub L. No. 109-
3.
2009] LEARNING NEUROSCIENCE THE HARD WAY 837
Based on those experiences and continuing concerns about
the welfare and effective representation of those suffering
disease or trauma-induced brain injury, I will argue here that
the criminal justice process provides an excellent reference point
by which to judge the adequacy of the civil justice process in
cases where severely incapacitated persons are alleged to be in
need of medical or rehabilitation services. Had Theresa Marie
Schindler Schiavo (commonly known as "Terri") been a criminal
facing either the death penalty or a term of incarceration in any
state or federal court in the United States, the ethical and legal
norms built into the process by which criminal charges are
proved, defended, and appealed would have required the federal
appellate courts to order the State of Florida to conduct a new
trial in strict conformity to the civil guardianship and medical
neglect process mandated by Florida and federal law.
Part I looks at the three main "narratives" that are
commonly employed to describe the Schiavo case, and it
recounts the basic facts concerning Terri Schiavo's brain injury
and the early, but quickly-abandoned, attempt at rehabilitation.
Part II is an examination of how the demise of one of the most
profoundly harmful dogmas in the history of medicine-the
theory that the brain is "hard-wired" and that no amount of
rehabilitation can cause the brain to rewire itself-occurred too
late in the litigation for the judges or advocates in either
Schiavo or Englaro to understand that Terri and Eluana might
actually have been able to communicate "cognitively" rather
than physically. That too is a cautionary tale about the ways in
which "iconoclastic researchers" were able to use state-of-the-art
diagnostic imaging and aggressive, but (then) unorthodox,
rehabilitation techniques to demonstrate that conventional
wisdom in neurology in the 1990s was simply wrong. Part III
develops a model of ethical and effective representation and
judging brain injury cases, and Parts IV through VII draw
lessons from that model based on the facts of the Schiavo case.
I. WHAT HAPPENED TO TERRI SCHIAvO? A TALE OF FOUR
NARRATIVES
Exploring the legal and ethical reasons why the civil justice
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4
system failed so badly in the Schiavo case is not easy. At the
beginning of this article, I described the Schiavo case as
"notable, complex, and cautionary." Most commentators agree,
but their understanding of the facts leads them to utilize three
very different narratives in their telling of the story.15 In this
section, I will discuss each of these narratives in detail, but will
begin with a common point of reference: the facts that appear in
the trial and appellate records of the Schiavo case. For present
purposes, this is the fourth, or "Transcript Narrative." The
other three are the "Death with Dignity" narrative, the "Killing
Terri Schiavo" narrative, and the "Judicial Independence"
narrative.
A. The "Transcript" Narrative
1. The Medical Case and Initial Court Proceedings
The medical facts of the Schiavo case are fairly
straightforward. Sometime before 5:00 a.m. on February 25,
1990, Theresa Marie ("Terri") Schindler Schiavo, then twenty-
six years old, suffered cardio-respiratory arrest.16 According to
15 The importance of characterization cannot be understated. One goal of this article
is to explain why the Schiavo case is an excellent example of the dangers that arise for
both law and medicine when policy disputes are resolved through a process of
"characterization," rather than a careful analysis of the facts and an equally careful
balancing of the relevant interests involved. Kathleen Sullivan describes the difference
between the two approaches as follows:
Categorization and balancing each employ quite different rhetoric.
Categorization is the taxonomist's style-a job of classification and labeling.
When categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigation is done
at the outset. Once the relevant right and mode of infringement have been
described, the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial balancing of the
claimed right against the government's justification for the infringement.
Balancing is more like grocer's work (or Justice's)-the judge's job is to place
competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them against each other.
Here the outcome is not determined at the outset, but depends on the relative
strength of a multitude of factors. These two styles have competed endlessly in
contemporary constitutional law; neither has ever entirely eclipsed the other.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293-94 (1992).
16 JON R. THOGMARTIN, M.D. et al., REPORT OF AUTOPSY: THERESA SCHIAVO, CASE
NO. 5050439 at 2 (June 13, 2005), available at
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court and medical examiner documents, her husband, Michael
Schiavo, found her lying face-down on the floor at 5:00 a.m. He
placed a call to Terri's father, Robert Schindler, at around 5:40
a.m. Mr. Schindler told him to hang up and call for emergency
medical assistance. According to logs kept by the St.
Petersburg, Florida, police, the emergency call was received at
5:40 a.m. Emergency medical services personnel arrived
approximately twelve minutes later (at 5:52 a.m.) and began
resuscitation immediately. According to the Report of the
Pinellas County Medical Examiner: "[a]lthough a pulse was
documented at 06:32hrs, a measurable systolic blood pressure
was not recorded until 0646hrs[,] almost one hour after
resuscitation began."' 7 The result was a massive brain injury.'"
Intensive rehabilitation efforts and the first set of legal
proceedings-medical malpractice cases against her primary
care physician and the gynecologist who had been treating her
for infertility-began shortly thereafter.
2. The Guardianship Case
At the root of the legal case was an intra-familial dispute
over the nature, quality, and extent of the rehabilitation and
medical care provided to Terri Schiavo after she was released
from the hospital. Because Terri had left no advance directive of
any kind, her husband, Michael Schiavo, became her legal
guardian by operation of Florida law.19 Her parents, Robert and
Mary Schindler, believed Mr. Schiavo to be unfit to serve as
guardian, and mounted several unsuccessful attempts to have
the court remove him so that they could assert their right as
parents under Florida law to undertake the guardianship role
themselves.
www.sptimes.com/2005/06/15/schiavoreport.pdf, at 29.
17 The post-mortem examination of Mrs. Schiavo showed "marked, global anoxic,
ischemic encephalopathy resulting in massive cerebral atrophy," but was unable to draw
any conclusions concerning the condition and function of her brain at any point during
her life post-trauma. See id. at 9; www.sptimes.com/2005/06/15/schiavoreport.pdf, at 35
(Questions 5-7).
18 Id. at 8.
19 FLA. STAT. §§ 765.401, 744.312 (2007).
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Review of the extensive, verbatim trial record developed
over more than fifteen years discloses that there were
significant, and unresolved, disputes between Terri's husband
and her parents over brain function, including visual and
auditory abilities, and the physical response of her brain to
various forms of stimulation.20 These disputes led to an ongoing
battle over the value of rehabilitation, basic medical care, and
routine forms of physical and mental stimulation such as
listening to music and trips outdoors. 21 They eventually led to
complaints by Terri's parents that Michael had abandoned her,
first by refusing to continue rehabilitation, and later, through
his relationship with other women, including one with whom he
had two children.22
Money also played a role in this dispute. The medical
malpractice case against the gynecologist resulted in a 1993
20 See generally Transcript of Record at Vol. IV, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No.
90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15-17, 20, 22, 2002).
21 See infra text accompanying note 29.
22 Second Amended Petition to Remove Guardian at 3-8, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005). Ironically, the Schindler
family might have been more successful in their attempts to remove Michael Schiavo as
guardian had they petitioned the guardianship court for a divorce. In 1994, the Fifth
District Court of Appeals held that Florida's no-fault divorce law allows for dissolution
proceedings to be filed against the competent spouse on behalf of the ward. Vaughan v.
Guardianship of Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Although the
majority view is that a guardian or conservator needs express statutory authority to
commence a dissolution action on behalf of the ward, see Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d
781 (S.C. 1993); In re Marriage of Drews, 503 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. 1986), cert. denied, Drews
v. Drews, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987), courts in other states began to accept the proposition
that the best interests of the ward may sometimes require the initiation of divorce
proceedings. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 683-84 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that a guardian may bring a dissolution action on behalf of the
incapacitated ward pursuant to his general powers to act on the ward's behalf); Smith v.
Smith, 335 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that guardian of incompetent
person can file divorce action against competent spouse); Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335,
341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] guardian of an adult incompetent ward may initiate
divorce proceedings on behalf of the ward."); Broach v. Broach, 895 N.E.2d 640 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008); Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993)
(holding a guardian ad litem has the authority to obtain a divorce on behalf of an
incompetent person); Stubbs v. Ortega, 977 S.W.2d 718, 724 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) ('Texas
public policy does not prohibit authorizing a guardian to petition for divorce on behalf of
her mentally incapacitated ward.").
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award of $750,000 in economic damages23 to Terri Schiavo, and
$300,000 in damages for loss of consortium and non-economic
damages to Michael,24 who had testified in 1992 that his
incapacitated wife was expected to live out her normal life span
and that he would provide for her health care.25 By early 1994,
however, his position had changed. When Terri developed a
urinary tract infection, he elected not to treat it and requested a
"Do Not Resuscitate" order in the event she suffered another
cardiac arrest.26 When the nursing facility resisted the order, he
cancelled it and transferred her to another facility.27 In 2000,
Michael transferred Terri (who was not terminally ill) to the
hospice in which she spent the last five years of her life.28 From
that point forward, her parents alleged, he would not permit
routine medical or dental care, or any form of physical
stimulation, including physical therapy or rehabilitation, the
23 Jay Wolfson, Guardian Ad Litem for Theresa Marie Schiavo, A REPORT TO
GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF THERESA
MARIE SCHIAVO 9 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at
http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/WolfsonReport.pdf.
24 Id. at 9; see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177-78 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Schiavo 11.
25 Direct testimony of Michael Schiavo, Transcript of Record, Barnett Bank Trust
Company as Guardian of the Property of Theresa Schiavo and Michael Schiavo,
Individually v. G. Stephen Igel, M.D., No. 92-939-15 (November 5, 1992) at p. 26, line 25
through p. 28, line 4 [hereafter "Medical Malpractice Case"]. See also, Jurisdiction Brief
of Petitioners, Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC03-1242), 2003 WL
22400860, at *1.
26 Wolfson, supra note 23, at 10. Depending on its severity, an untreated urinary
tract infection (UTI) can lead to acute renal failure. See U.S. National Library of
Medicine & National Institutes of Health, Kidney Infection, MEDLINEPLUS MEDICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000522.htm#Expectations%20(prognosi
s) (last accessed March 9, 2009); id. ("Acute Renal Failure - Prognosis.") available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000501.htm#Expectations%20(prognosi
s) (last accessed March 9, 2009).
27 Wolfson, supra note 23, at 10.
28 See Second Amended Petition to Remove Guardian at 15-16, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005). Terri Schiavo did not have a
"terminal condition." Federal rules governing reimbursement for hospice care limit
allowable reimbursement to periods for which the physician "must specify that the
individual's prognosis is for a life expectancy of 6 months or less if the terminal illness
runs its normal course." See 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1) (Certification of terminal illness); 42
C.F.R. § 418.21 (Duration of hospice care coverage-Election periods).
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use of a wheelchair to take her outside, natural light from the
window, or music in her room.2 9 As we shall see in the next
section, that lack of stimulation guaranteed a downward spiral
in both the physical condition of her brain and a reduction in
whatever amount of cognitive ability she had."°
All of these factors led the Florida District Court of Appeal
to recognize that "both Michael and the Schindlers [were]
suspicious that the other party [was] assessing Theresa's wishes
based upon their own monetary self-interest,"'" but that it saw
"no evidence in this record that either Michael or the Schindlers
seek monetary gain from their actions. [They] simply cannot
agree on what decision Theresa would make today if she were
able to assess her own condition and make her own decision."32
The district court did hold, however, that Michael could not be
29 See Second Amended Petition to Remove Guardian at 17-21, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005).
30 It was known as early as 1994 that music has a discernable effect on the brain
that can be measured by neuroimaging technologies such as positron emission
tomography (PET scanning) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (IMRI). See K.
Vlad Hachinski & Vladimir Hachinski, Music and the Brain, 151 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 293,
295 (1994) (noting that "PET can now be used to ascertain areas of brain stimulation
during auditory processing" and that "[platients subjected to musical stimuli displayed
activity in the frontotemporal areas of the brain"). Accord Annirudh D. Patel, Language,
Music, Syntax, and the Brain, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 674, 679 (July 2003) (proposing
the "hypothesis that linguistic and musical syntax share certain syntactic processes
(instantiated in overlapping frontal brain areas) that apply over different domain-
specific syntactic representations in posterior brain regions"). The post-mortem
examination of Terri Schiavo's brain showed "relative preservation of the frontal and
temporal lobes"-areas that could have been scanned in an attempt to ascertain some of
her cognitive abilities. See Letter from Stephen J. Nelson, Chief Medical Examiner, 10th
Judicial Circuit of Florida, to Jon R. Thogmartin, District 6 Medical Examiner 4 (June 8,
2005) (Neuropathology Report) in THOGMARTIN, supra note 4 at 15.
31 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The
court further explained as follows:
This lawsuit is affected by an earlier lawsuit. In the early 1990s, Michael
Schiavo, as Theresa's guardian, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit. That case
resulted in a sizable award of money for Theresa. This fund remains sufficient
to care for Theresa for many years. If she were to die today, her husband
would inherit the money under the laws of intestacy. If Michael eventually
divorced Theresa in order to have a more normal family life, the fund
remaining at the end of Theresa's life would presumably go to her parents.
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permitted to make the decision to continue or refuse life-
sustaining treatment by stating as follows:
33
Because Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers could not agree on
the proper decision and the inheritance issue created the
appearance of conflict, [the Court of Appeal permitted] Michael
Schiavo, as the guardian of Theresa, to invoke[ ] the trial
court's jurisdiction to allow the trial court to serve as the
surrogate decision-maker.
34
As we shall see in the discussion below, it is my contention
that this ruling was legally and ethically erroneous on several
grounds, 35 and that it tainted the fact-finding process to the
point where it became necessary to argue that Terri Schiavo was
denied the rudiments of due process in the guardianship.
B. The "Public Narratives"
1. The "Death with Dignity" Narrative
36
The first of the "public narratives" is told from the
perspective of Michael Schiavo, Terri Schiavo's husband. In
Michael Schiavo's version of the story, Terri was "brain dead"
37
when the litigation began, and his efforts to seek an end to
33 Id. In light of the finding that there was an appearance of conflict of interest, this
holding was required by the conflict of interest provisions of Florida's guardianship
statute. FLA. STAT. § 744.309(3) (2009).
34 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 178.
35 The Court of Appeal was correct in its view that Florida law does not
automatically compel the appointment of a guardian ad litem when a surrogate decision-
maker may ultimately inherit from the patient, because it recognized that "there may be
occasions when an inheritance could be a reason to question a surrogate's ability to make
an objective decision." Id. Its mistake, discussed below in Part VI(D), was that Florida
law expressly forbids the appointment of a guardian who has a potential conflict of
interest.
36 See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, (Mis)framing Schiavo as Discrimination
Against Persons with Disabilities, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 789 (2007).
37 See, e.g., Richard Luscombe, Bush Defied in Right-to-Die Case, THE GUARDIAN
(London, UK), Mar. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mar/23/richardluscombe ('The Schindlers say
their daughter is responsive and could improve with treatment, but her husband,
Michael Schiavo, claims she is brain dead....").
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further nutrition and hydration was "not merely ... [a fight] for
what he thought was right, but also for what he claimed Terri
wanted for herself."
38
The medical testimony presented on Michael's behalf
supports the guardianship court's finding that Terri Schiavo was
in a persistent vegetative state39 throughout the course of the
guardianship. Three witnesses testified that Terri Schiavo had
made four oral statements to the effect that she would not want
to be kept alive by artificial means were she to become
incapacitated. Her husband, Michael, testified that Terri had
stated that she did not want to be a burden on her family or "live
like that. 4 ° Michael's brother, Scott Schiavo, testified that Terri
had told him that she did not "want to be kept alive on a
machine,' 41 and Michael's sister-in-law, Joan Schiavo, testified
38 Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 733, 733-34 (2007). The author went on to state as follows:
But Michael Schiavo claimed not merely to be fighting for what he thought was
right, but also for what he claimed Terri wanted for herself. His position was
that it was not a vindication of his interests that he sought, but hers. And he
was fighting not only for Terri, but for a principle-that the wishes of patients
who are unable (and never will be able) to speak for themselves be respected.
This being the case, giving in to the Schindlers was not having his cake and
eating it, too. It was not even a compromise. It was a sellout: a betrayal of
Terri and a betrayal of a principle.
Id. at 734.
39 See, e.g., Brad Smith, Schiavo Videotapes Offer Powerful But Misleading Evidence,
TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 2005, at 12, available at
http://news.tbo.com/news/MGBQ67CTI6E.html ("[Videotapes taken at the nursing home]
more accurately show the Pinellas Park woman, argue some doctors and Michael
Schiavo, who says his wife is brain-dead and should die in dignity after 15 years[,] in
what doctors term a persistent vegetative state.").
40 Money, Fear and Prejudice: Why the Courts Killed Terri Schiavo, 30 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 42, 84 (2008) (quoting Transcript of Trial at 31-31, 33, In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908GC-003 (Fla Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2000)). Professor Patricia Norwood
Harris provides the "alleged oral statements by Terri and their context.., as follows":
#1. If [she] "ever had to be a burden to anybody like [her uncle was to her
grandmother], [she didn't] want to live like that." [Allegedly said to Michael
Schiavo during a train ride.]
#2. Do not "keep [me] alive on anything artificial." [Allegedly said to Michael
Schiavo while watching a documentary.]
Id.
41 Id. (quoting Excerpts of Trial at 15, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-
2908GC-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2000)). Professor Harris provides the January 24,
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that she and Terri had agreed, after watching a movie "about a
guy who had an accident and he was in a comma [sic]," that "we
would want it stated in our will we should want the tubes and
everything taken out."42 Based on this evidence, Judge Greer
found that Terri Schiavo would have refused further artificial
nutrition and hydration.
It is that finding that leads most commentators to accept
the "right to die" narrative, and to assert that the Schiavo case
is legally significant because the Florida and federal judiciaries
stood firm for the preservation of the privacy and personal
autonomy of persons who, like Terri, had entered a persistent
vegetative state without leaving an advance directive. 3 That
finding is also politically significant. In some versions of the
"death with dignity narrative," the debates in Congress and the
Florida Legislature pitted civil libertarians against "vitalists"
whose "fundamentally primitive belief[s]" lead them to conclude
that "despite the absence of cognition of any sort, a beating
heart in a permanently unconscious human needs to be
protected the same way as a beating heart in a human who has
cognition and sentience. 44
2000, testimony of Scott Schiavo as follows: #3. 'If I ever go like that, just let me
go. Don't leave me there. I don't want to be kept alive on a machine.' [Allegedly said to
Scott Schiavo at a funeral luncheon for Scott's grandmother in February of 1986.]" Id.
42 Id. (quoting Excerpts of Trial at 40, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-
2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000)). Professor Harris provides the January 24,
2000, testimony of Joan Schiavo as follows:
#4. We had watched a movie one time on television. It was about somebody. I
don't remember. I don't remember the movie. It was about a guy who had an
accident and he was in a comma [sic]. There was no help for him. We had
stated that if that ever happened to one of us, in our lifetime, we would not
want to go through that. That we would want it stated in our will we should
want the tubes and everything taken out." [Allegedly said to Joan Schiavo, who
could not remember the date.]
Id.
43 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005).
See also Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Bio-Politics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric,
Terri Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553 (2006).
- Kenneth Goodman, Ethics Schmethics: The Schiavo Case and the Culture Wars, 61
U. MIAMI L. REV. 863, 868 (2007).
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2. The "Killing Terri Schiavo" Narrative45
This version of the public narrative is told from the
perspective of Robert and Mary Schindler, Terri Schiavo's
parents. Based on exactly the same trial record, the Schindlers
characterized the case as one involving medical and judicial
neglect.
The Schindler family disputed the all-important finding
46
that Terri Schiavo was in a "persistent vegetative state" in a
variety of ways, including an appearance on The Oprah Winfrey
Show to present a videotape that, in their view, showed that
Terri was at least minimally aware of her surroundings.47 They
countered Michael's evidence with testimony from Terri's
mother, Mary Schindler, and Diane Meyer, one of Terri's
childhood close friends, that the two of them had discussed with
Terri the dispute about termination of life-sustaining measures
that had arisen in the highly-publicized case of Karen Ann
Quinlan.4" Based on those conversations, Mrs. Schindler and
Ms. Meyer testified that Terri would not, under the
circumstances, elect to forego artificial nutrition and
hydration. 49 The other Schindler family witness, Jackie Rhodes,
45 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Killing Terri Schiavo, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 585 (2006)
("But it reduces to this: The State of Florida, acting through its judiciary, ordered a
severely disabled woman to be slowly dehydrated and starved to death, by removing her
feeding tube.").
46 See FLA. STAT. § 765.305 (2007) ("procedure in the absence of a living will").
47 Dave Reynolds, Schindlers Appeal Judge's Efforts To Block Them From Schiavo
Suit; Family Takes Case To Oprah Show, INCLUSION DAILY EXPRESS, Nov. 17, 2003,
available at http://www.mnddc.org/news/inclusion-daily/2O03/11/11 l703fladvschiavo.htm
(noting that "Terri's parents believe that she is alert and responsive and that she might
improve with rehabilitative therapies that Mr. Schiavo has denied her for at least the
past 10 years.").
48 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert denied 429 US 922 (1976).
49 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising) Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of
Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 397-98, 398 n.43 (2005) (quoting Transcript of
Record at 372-73, 762, In re Guardianship of Schiavo No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
January 2000)). Direct examinations of Mary Schindler and Diane Meyer, respectively,
provided as follows:
Mary Schindler (Ms. Schiavo's mother) and Diane Meyer (Ms. Schiavo's
childhood friend) testified that, based on conversations with Ms. Schiavo about
the widely publicized Quinlan case (involving a dispute about termination of
life-sustaining measures), they believed that Ms. Schiavo would not, under the
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"testified that in the many times she and Ms. Schiavo had
visited her grandmother in a nursing home, Ms. Schiavo never
expressed to her that she would wish to decline artificial
nutrition and hydration were she ever to fall into a profoundly
dependent condition."5 °  They argued on appeal that the
evidence presented by Michael Schiavo and his relatives
concerning the choice Terri would have made, had she been
capable of doing so, was not "clear and convincing."'" They also
questioned the integrity of the fact-finding process by seeking to
have the judge recuse himself 2 and by filing several motions to
have Michael Schiavo removed as Terri's guardian.
5"
From the perspective of the Schindler family and their
supporters, the "death with dignity" narrative ignored advances
in both diagnostic imaging and rehabilitation medicine, and it
served as a political cover from what they saw as his desire for
Terri "to die so that he can marry another woman with whom he
has fathered two children, and so he can benefit from what's left
of an insurance settlement that now pays for her treatment.
54
When their efforts to protect their daughter failed in the courts,
they sought redress of their grievances from the political
branches. To the Schindlers, the order to withhold further
nutrition and hydration made the case into the functional
equivalent of a death penalty case in which procedural and
substantive errors at the trial level render the verdict inherently
unreliable.55
circumstances, elect to decline artificial nutrition and hydration.
Id. at 397-98.
50 Id. at 398.
51 For a complete analysis of the evidence presented by the five witnesses who
testified at the trial, see Snead, supra note 49, at 392-404.
52 The Motion to Recuse Judge Greer was filed on April 10, 2001, and it was denied.
See Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI ETHICS PROGRAMS: SCHIAVO CASE RESOURCES, available
at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (last accessed March 5, 2009).
Id. at August 10, 2001. There were several attempts to remove Michael Schiavo as
guardian. See William R. Levesque, Carrie Johnson & Anita Kumar, Without a Ruling,
the Wait Continues, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at 1A, available at 2005
WLNR 23899652.
- See Reynolds, supra note 47.
55 Statement of Interest of the United States, Schiavo ex. rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
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3. The "Judicial Independence" Narrative
The "judicial independence" narrative pits the fact-finding
powers of the courts against the clemency powers of the
executive branch. Its focus is on the separation of powers
violations that are alleged to have occurred when the Florida
Legislature authorized the Governor to stay execution of Judge
Greer's order to remove the feeding tube pending a review of the
evidence by an independent guardian ad litem, and the
federalism and civil rights violations that allegedly occurred
when Congress and the President approved a bill that permitted
de novo review of the evidence considered by the Florida courts.
The "Judicial Independence" narrative arises because there
is a "true conflict"56 between the "Death with Dignity" narrative
associated with Michael Schiavo, and the "Killing Terri Schiavo"
narrative associated with Robert and Mary Schindler, her
parents. If, as the Schindlers alleged, Terri Schiavo was a
person with a severe cognitive disability who was not in
"persistent vegetative state" and who would not have chosen to
forego nutrition and hydration, then a judicial decree ordering
that nutrition and hydration be withheld is the functional
equivalent of condemning an innocent person to death. In this
case, a petition for redress of grievances addressed to the
political branches is the only feasible way to get a de novo
review of the record. If, by contrast, Terri Schiavo was in a
persistent vegetative state and she had stated clearly that she
would not have wanted to continue any form of treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, Florida law would have made
those statements controlling. From this perspective, further
litigation or intervention would have been a violation of her
rights.
The "judicial independence" narrative thus rests on the two
358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
56 The term "true conflict" is used to describe a problem in which the interests are
irreconcilable. In such a situation, one will, of necessity, be subordinated to the other.
When used in the field of choice of law, a finding that there is a "true conflict" requires
that the court attempt "a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of one state or the other ..." in an effort to avoid the conflict. See Brainerd
Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963).
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findings of fact that support the guardianship court's ruling that
nutrition and hydration should be withdrawn: 1) that Terri
Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state; and 2) that she
would have chosen to refuse further nutrition and hydration
rather than continue life in a persistent vegetative state. In this
narrative, once those findings are in place, the courts have
primary responsibility for ensuring that an incompetent person's
"choices" regarding continued treatment are respected. From
the judiciary's perspective, any attempt by the Governor or the
Legislature to interfere with the execution of the incompetent
person's choice to refuse further treatment is a violation of both
separation of powers and individual rights.
Governor Jeb Bush, by contrast, had his own separation of
powers argument. He argued that the executive branch, not the
judiciary, is ultimately charged by the Florida and federal
constitutions with the protection of the civil rights of individuals
whose deaths are ordered, or facilitated, by judicial decree. On
this point, he was most certainly correct. In capital cases, it is
assumed that the executive branch provides a "check" on the
powers of the judiciary. Post-conviction attacks on the integrity
of the judicial fact-finding process are routine,57 and capital
defendants and their advocates nearly always seek final review
through the Governor's clemency power. This process allows the
Governor, or clemency panel, to review the evidence alleged to
support the finding of guilt, as well as the integrity of the
process in which those findings were made.
House Bill 35-E,5" dubbed "Terri's Law" by the media, was
67 Attacks on the integrity of the fact-finding process are so routine that Congress
has taken steps to limit the ability of capital defendants to seek writs of habeas corpus
from the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2262(c) (2007) (limiting the number of habeas
corpus petitions that can be filed on behalf of a prisoner sentenced to death).
58 H.B. 35-E, 105th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2003) available at
http://laws.flrules.org/2003/ch 2003-418.pdf. The substance of the statute provided that:
(1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay to prevent
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15,
2003:
(a) That patient has no written advance directive;
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
(d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the withholding of
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modeled on the executive clemency proceedings employed in
Florida capital cases.59  It gave the Governor post-judgment
review powers in cases where the families dispute the findings
or the fairness of the proceeding. The Bill's main features
included:
(1) Stay of execution 61 pending review of the facts of the case
and the fairness of the judicial process by the Governor; 61
(2) Appointment by the chief judge of the circuit court of an
independent guardian ad litem whose loyalties are to the
ward alone;62 and
(3) A report to the chief judge and the Governor of the
guardian ad litem's findings and conclusions,6 3 after
which the Governor could either dissolve the stay or seek
such further relief on behalf of the ward as might be
warranted under the circumstances.
nutrition and hydration.
(2) The Governor's authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the
effective date of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not impact
the validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act. The Governor
may lift the stay authorized under this act at any time. A person may not be
held civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary sanctions for
taking any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor pursuant to
this act.
(3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the Governor
and the court.
Id.
59 Compare FLA. CONST. art. IV, §8 (Clemency), with 2003 Fla. Laws 418.
60 Compare FLA. STAT. § 922.06 (Stay of Execution of Death Sentence) with 2003 Fla.
Laws 418, at §§ 1-2 (authorizing Governor to issue a temporary stay order ensuring
continued nutrition and hydration).
61 Cf. FLA. STAT. § 940.03 (2007) (an application for executive clemency "may require
the submission of a certified copy of the applicant's indictment or information, the
judgment adjudicating the applicant to be guilty, and the sentence, if sentence has been
imposed, and may also require the applicant to send a copy of the application to the
judge and prosecuting attorney of the court in which the applicant was convicted,
notifying them of the applicant's intent to apply for executive clemency.").
62 Compare FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851(b) ("Appointment of Post-Conviction Counsel")
with FLA. STAT. § 27.703 (specific conflicts of interest).
6 Compare FLA. CONST. art. IV, §8(a) (clemency requires approval of two members of
the cabinet), with 2003 Fla. Laws 418 §3 (providing for a report to the Governor and the
court by the guardian ad litem).
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When the Governor entered the stay authorized by the
statute,64 the stage was set for the confrontation between the
political branches and the courts that marked the final chapters
of the Schiavo case. When the Florida Supreme Court held, in
Schiavo v. Bush,6 5 that Terri's Law was unconstitutional, the
Schindler family's only recourse was to seek a writ of habeas
corpus from the federal courts.
II. THE MEDICAL CONTEXT
Since most of the commentary characterizes the Schiavo
case as one involving "the right to die," most articles dealing
with the case actually engage the debate over the correctness of
the Florida courts' decision that Terri should be "allowed to die"
from the marked dehydration that occurs when a PEG (feeding)
tube is withdrawn. This article does not address that topic
directly. Nor, in my view, should it.
A lawyer who accepts the duty of representing a client
understands that "representation. . . , including representation
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities."66
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules also
assume that the lawyer can maintain enough distance from the
facts to maintain "independent professional judgment." 7  In
cases where one's client is a person who has suffered a severe
brain injury, the obvious reference point is Rule 1.14 of the ABA
Model Rules, which provides, in relevant part:
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has
diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial
or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act
in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably
64 See Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at:
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/schiavo/flagovexord03201.html (last accessed March
4, 2009).
- Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005).
66 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2006).
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
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necessary protective action, including consulting with
individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to
protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
68
In the Schiavo case, the family was at odds over whether to
continue treatment at all. The litigation that ensued showed
just how "aspirational" the client autonomy model embedded in
Rule 1.14 can be.69  Patients who have suffered serious brain
injuries that cause significant impairment of their cognitive
abilities are, by definition, "not autonomous." Providing
effective representation requires the diligent attorney to embark
on a crash course of "on the job" training in neurology, cognitive
and consciousness disorders, diagnostic imaging, and
rehabilitation medicine. An attorney cannot possibly defend the
rights of a client with a consciousness disorder or cognitive
disability without at least a basic understanding of that
disability.
Kendall Coffey's recent article, "Litigating at Light
Speed,"7 is an excellent primer for lawyers who find themselves
embroiled in litigation that pushes their legal, organizational,
professional, and personal-relations skills (not to mention their
physical stamina71) to the limit.
One of the most remarkable battlefields for light speed
litigation was the tragic and multi-faceted case of Terri
Schiavo. As the entire nation would learn, she was the center
of a heartbreaking controversy between her husband and
parents concerning the question of whether nutrition and
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b).
69 For a more in-depth discussion of Rule 1.14, see infra Part VI(B).
70 Kendall Coffey, Litigating at Light Speed, 83 FLA. B. J. 20, 25-26 (Jan. 2009).
71 Id. at 26:
Among other truths about 24/7 lawyering that [George] Felos[, lead counsel for
Michael Schiavo,] and [David] Gibbs[, lead counsel for the Schindler family,]
emphasize repeatedly are the extraordinary human demands on health and
stamina. Gibbs spoke of the "absolutely unbelievable physical, emotional, and
mental pressures" confronted in the Schiavo litigation. Correspondingly, in his
efforts to meet those challenges, Felos underscored the value of being in good
condition before entering a no-sleep zone, where fatigue can be a constant
companion even as adversities intensify and magnify.
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hydration should be withdrawn due to the limited brain
functions resulting from heart failure 15 years earlier.
Following the state trial judge's decision to remove feeding
tubes on March 18, 2005, trails were blazed through state and
federal courts at trial and appellate levels, lasting until Terri
Schiavo's death on March 31, 2005.
The case was litigated by both sides with great ability and a
remarkable capacity to respond effectively to some of the most
abbreviated and intense deadlines imaginable.
72
Those of us involved as attorneys in the Schiavo case
certainly appreciate the compliment. But "the most abbreviated
and intense deadlines imaginable"7 3 were the least of our
worries. The real problem for the attorneys on the Schindlers'
team was the lack of a scientifically sound diagnosis based on
state-of-the-art diagnostics. Getting one turned out to be an
impossible task.
A. First Things First: Brain Injuries Causing Severe Cognitive
Disabilities
Brain injuries are common. Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
"occurs when a sudden trauma causes damage to the brain[,
and] can result when the head suddenly and violently hits an
object, or when an object pierces the skull and enters brain
tissue."74 Not surprisingly, it is the leading cause of injury and
disability in Afghanistan and Iraq.75 Acquired brain injuries
(ABIs) are caused by tumors, blood clots, strokes, seizures, toxic
exposures, infections, metabolic disorders, neurotoxic poisoning,
72 Id. at 25-26.
73 Id. at 26.
74 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Traumatic Brain
Injury Information Page, available at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tbi/tbi.htm
(last accessed May 3, 2009). See also Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Brain, available
at http://www.ric.org/conditions/brainlwhatis/index.aspx (last accessed Mar. 9, 2009).
75 Edgar Jones et al., Shell Shock and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Historical
Review, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1641, 1641 (2007); see also Charles W. Hoge et. al., Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury in U.S. Soldiers Returning from Iraq, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED.
453, 454 (May 15, 2008).
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and anoxia (lack of oxygen).76 Stroke occurs when blood or fluid
invades the tissues of the brain.77 Every year, some 750,000
Americans suffer a stroke,78 thus making it a leading cause of
serious, long-term adult disability in the United States. Terri
Schiavo's injury was caused by cortical hypoxia, "a condition in
which there is a decrease of oxygen supply to the brain even
though there is adequate blood flow. ' '79  It can be caused by
"[d]rowning, strangling, choking, suffocation, cardiac arrest,
head trauma, carbon monoxide poisoning, and complications of
general anesthesia ....
Whatever the cause, the results of a brain injury can be
devastating.
Approximately half of severely head-injured patients will need
surgery to remove or repair hematomas (ruptured blood
vessels) or contusions (bruised brain tissue). Disabilities
resulting from a TBI depend upon the severity of the injury,
the location of the injury, and the age and general health of the
individual. Some common disabilities include problems with
cognition (thinking, memory, and reasoning), sensory
processing (sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell),
communication (expression and understanding), and behavior
or mental health (depression, anxiety, personality changes,
aggression, acting out, and social inappropriateness). More
serious head injuries may result in stupor, an unresponsive
state, but one in which an individual can be aroused briefly by
a strong stimulus, such as sharp pain; coma, a state in which
an individual is totally unconscious, unresponsive, unaware,
and unarousable; vegetative state, in which an individual is
76 Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Brain, available at
http://www.ric.org/conditions/brain/whatis/index.aspx (last accessed Mar. 9, 2009).
77 The National Institutes of Neurological Disorders & Stroke ("NINDS") reports
that four million Americans are living with the effects of stroke. See NINDS Traumatic
Brain Injury Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tbi/tbi.htm (last
accessed Mar. 2, 2009).
78 SHARON BEGLEY, TRAIN YOUR MIND, CHANGE YOUR BRAIN: HOW A NEW SCIENCE
REVEALS OUR EXTRAORDINARY POTENTIAL TO TRANSFORM OURSELVES 120 (Ballantine
Books 2007).
79 NINDS Cerebral Hypoxia Information Page, What is Hypoxia?, available at
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disordersanoxia/anoxia.htm (last accessed March 4, 2009).
8o Id.
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unconscious and unaware of his or her surroundings, but
continues to have a sleep-wake cycle and periods of alertness;
and a persistent vegetative state (PVS), in which an individual
stays in a vegetative state for more than a month.81
A lawyer accepting the task of representing any party to a
dispute over a brain injury thus has quite a bit of studying to do.
In order to offer "effective representation," the lawyer needs to
learn as much as possible about the art, science, and politics of
neuroscience.
8 2
B. The 1990s Conventional Wisdom: A "Hardwired Brain"
The view that the brain is "hardwired" is traceable to the
influential, but erroneous, theories of one the founders of
modern neurology, Spanish Nobel Laureate Santiago Ram6n y
Cajal. Writing in 1911, Cajal observed that "[iun the adult
centers [of the brain] the nerve paths are something fixed, ended
and immutable.8 3
Conventional wisdom in neuroscience held that the adult
mammalian brain is fixed in two respects: no new neurons are
born in it, and the function of the structures that make it up
are immutable, so that if genes and development dictate that
this cluster of neurons will process signals from the eye, and
this cluster will move the fingers of the right hand, then by god
they'll do that and nothing else come hell or high water. There
was good reason why all those extravagantly illustrated brain
books show the function, size, and location of the brain's
structures in permanent ink. As late as 1999, neurologists
writing in the prestigious journal Science admitted, "We are
still taught that the fully mature brain lacks the intrinsic
mechanisms needed to replenish neurons and reestablish
neuronal networks after acute injury or in response to the
81 NINDS Traumatic Brain Injury Page, What is the Prognosis?, available at
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tbi/tbi.htm (last accessed Mar. 24, 2009).
82 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (Competence) (2006).
8 Begley, supra note 78 at 5 (quoting SANTIAGO RAMON Y CAJAL, HISTOLOGY OF THE
NERVOUS SYSTEM OF MAN AND VERTEBRATES (Neely Swanson & Larry Swanson trans.,
Oxford University Press 1995)).
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insidious loss of neurons seen in neurodegenerative diseases."8 4
In the pages that follow, I will make the case that the
rejection of neuroplasticity had a profound impact on the
litigation, on the autopsy report, and on media accounts of the
case.
Today, it is common knowledge that science has yet to
unlock even a fraction of the mysteries of the brain and nervous
system. In the early 1990s, when Terri Schiavo and Eluana
Englaro suffered their respective head injuries, the scientific
mainstream was far more confident about what it knew about
the adaptive abilities of neurons than it is today. It should not
be at all surprising that the lawyers and judges who relied on
the conventional scientific wisdom knew even less.
Until quite recently, it was simply assumed that the brain
and central nervous system are largely unable to adapt to
experience, including injury. 5 Today we know that the opposite
is true. The brain and nervous system are enormously adaptive
because neurons have the ability to adapt physically in response
to stimuli and to shift the locus of brain function to compensate
for injuries and disease.8 6  In the early 1990s, however,
advocates for persons with severe cognitive disabilities faced an
uphill battle. Those who argued that the nervous system could
adapt, rewire itself, and recover at least some of its impaired
function if the injured person were enrolled in an aggressive
rehabilitation were viewed as charlatans and quacks.8 This
84 Id. at 6 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jack M. Parent, Brain, Heal Thyself, 283
SCIENCE 1126 (Feb. 19, 1999)).
85 See infra text accompanying note 95 ("The doctrine of the unchanging human
brain has had profound ramifications, none of them very optimistic. It led neurologists
to assume that rehabilitation for adults who had suffered brain damage from a stroke
was almost certainly a waste of time.").
86 See, e.g., Julien Doyon & Habib Benali, Reorganization and Plasticity in the Adult
Brain During Learning of Motor Skills, 15 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 161-67
(2005); Bogdan Draganski et al., Changes in Grey Matter Induced by Training: Newly
Honed Juggling Skills Show Up as a Transient Feature on a Brain-Imaging Scan, 427
NATURE 311, 311-12 (Jan. 22, 2004).
87 See National Public Radio, Science Friday (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/2007/Feblhour2_020207.html (last accessed, May 1,
2009).
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explains much of the skepticism evident in Judge Greer's rulings
in the guardianship proceeding. Experts had testified that there
was no hope of improvement because she had lost too much of
her brain, and that rehabilitation would have been a waste of
time.
Even if there had been a book entitled Neurology and
Consciousness Disorders: A Primer for Lawyers and Other
Dummies, reading it during the closing phases of a high-profile
case like Schiavo would not have been particularly helpful. The
88 See Transcript of Record at 974, 976, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-
GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15-17, 20-21, 2002) (providing questioning on cross
examination by Pamela Andersen, Esq., to Melvin Greer, M.D., a neurologist, who had
been called as a witness by Michael Schiavo. Dr. Greer's direct testimony begins at p.
864, line 24.):
Q. And you're telling the Court that physical therapy would be of no benefit?
A. That's right. Physical therapy is not a benefit in this circumstance.
Q. Would it have been a benefit in the past?
A. No, the only thing that would have been helpful is if she had a different
problem which led, unfortunately, to her being admitted in this terrible state.
No, the die was cast when she was found in this anoxic ischemic state and the
evolution of the problem was going to be coming. Her doctors did a great job in
being able to maintain adequate nutrition and control infection and so forth,
but there would be no difference in terms of the outcome.
Q. So you're saying that therapy would have had zero effect on her over the
years?
A. That's right.
Q. But this is an inevitable progression?
A. Yes, this is an inevitable progression.
Q. Is she going to inevitably progress into a more contracted state?
A. Well, she's pretty well contracted right now.
Q. When do you think that would have occurred?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. When do you think that would have occurred?
A. Over the course of her first year or two.
Q. So she would have been in The [sic] state of contracture that she is in today
by two years out from the injury?
A. No, the contracture continues to become more prominent, but she was in
decerebrate positioning. I mean, the contractures were continuing to emerge
as a consequence of the joints being maintained and the posturing. And
regardless of what one does to try to extend the joint, the contracture will occur
because of the [lack of] input from the brain.
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record in the Schiavo case was developed over the course of a
fifteen-year period, during which mainstream neuroscience
remained largely in the grip of Santiago Ram6n y Cajal's now-
discredited theory that the basic structures of the brain are fixed
and immutable. It remained so until nearly 2006, when Dr.
Edward Taub, of the University of Alabama, Birmingham, and
his colleagues "reported the results of the most rigorous trial
ever conducted" of "constraint-induced movement therapy." 9
Dr. Taub's rehabilitation experiment entailed immobilizing the
patient's good arm so that she would be forced to use the
'useless' arm if she wanted to hold something or feed herself or
get dressed or do the laborious rehabilitation exercises through
which he put patients."9  Dr. Taub's hypothesis was that
"learning not to use an affected arm [or other body parts]
accounted for much of a stroke patient's disability."91
The story of how Dr. Taub and "a few iconoclastic
neuroscientists [who successfully] challenged the paradigm that
the adult brain cannot change.. ."92 is told in Wall Street
Journal science reporter Sharon Begley's book, Train Your
Mind, Change Your Brain,93 a slim and eminently readable book
that should be required reading for any lawyer retained to
handle a case involving a brain injury. It should also be
required reading for all those commentators whose opinions
about the state of Terri Schiavo's brain were based on facts
developed with old technology, shaped by the conventional




Constraint-induced movement therapy (CI) forces the use of the affected side
by restraining the unaffected side. With CI therapy, the therapist constrains
the survivor's unaffected arm in a sling. The survivor then uses his or her
affected arm repetitively and intensively for two weeks.
See also, UAB Taub Therapy Clinic, "Constraint Induced Movement Therapy: Why It
Works," available at http://www.uabhealth.org/13227/.
90 Begley, supra note 78, at 121.
91 See id. at 120. Compare this theory with the testimony of Melvin Greer, M.D.,
quoted supra note 88.
92 Begley, supra note 78, at 8.
93 Id.
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wisdom, and defended with a certainty reserved for "true
believers" who cannot be bothered by the facts.94  Begley
observes:
The doctrine of the unchanging human brain has had profound
ramifications, none of them very optimistic. It led neurologists
to assume that rehabilitation for adults who had suffered brain
damage from a stroke was almost certainly a waste of time. It
suggested that trying to alter the pathological brain wiring
that underlies psychiatric diseases, such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression, was a fool's errand.
And it implied that other brain-based fixities, such as the
happiness "set point" to which a person returns after the
deepest tragedy or the greatest joy, are as unalterable as
Earth's orbit.
But the dogma is wrong. In the last years of the twentieth
century, a few iconoclastic neuroscientists challenged the
paradigm that the adult brain cannot change and made
discovery after discovery that, to the contrary, it retains
stunning powers of neuroplasticity. The brain can indeed be
rewired. It can expand the area that is wired to move the
fingers, forging new connections that underpin the dexterity of
an accomplished violinist. It can activate long-dormant wires
and run new cables like an electrician bringing a house up to
- Compare Kenneth Goodman, Ethics Schmethics: The Schiavo Case and the
Culture Wars, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 863, 865 (2007) ("What you learned from Dr.
Cranford, and especially from the slide he showed us, was that Terri Schiavo's cerebral
cortex was full of spinal fluid. Moreover, a flat EEG means that the part of your brain
that's supposed to do the thinking is not working. It means, as the autopsy showed
afterward, that this woman for fifteen years could not see, feel, hear, or experience
anything."), with Vidya P. Kulkarni, Kaiwen Lin & Selim R. Benbadis, EEG Findings in
the Persistent Vegetative State, 24 J. CLIN. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 433-37 (December 2007),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18090523 (last accessed Mar. 25, 2009)
(Abstract) ("EEG findings had no association with etiology and varied from one pattern
to another in the same patients' EEGs obtained at different times (see table). We
conclude that EEG findings in PVS are heterogeneous and too variable to be of
diagnostic value."), and Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative
State, 313 SCi. 1402 (Sept. 8, 2006) (noting that recent research "suggests a method by
which some noncommunicative patients, including those diagnosed as vegetative,
minimally conscious, or locked in, may be able to use their residual cognitive capabilities
to communicate their thoughts to those around them by modulating their own neural
activity.").
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code, so that regions that once saw can instead feel or hear ....
[C]ontrary to Ram6n y Cajal and most neuroscientists since
[Cajal won the Nobel Prize in 1906], the brain can change its
physical structure and its wiring long into adulthood.
95
C. The State of the Art, 2005 Through Early 2009: Detecting
Conscious Awareness in Patients Who Are Assumed to Be
Vegetative
Consider, if you will, the possibility that Terri Schiavo
might have been responsive at some cognitive level to friends
and family who visited. There was considerable testimony that
she was. 6 Consider next the possibility that she could have
been aware that the PEG tube had been withdrawn, and that
she was entering a process of dehydration that would inevitably
lead to her death.97 These are not far-fetched suggestions. The
authors of a September 2008 article entitled Detecting
Awareness in the Vegetative State, have observed that "recent
functional neuroimaging studies have suggested that islands of
preserved brain function may exist in a small percentage of
patients who have been diagnosed as vegetative."98
95 Begley, supra note 78, at 7-8.
96 See, e.g., supra note 88 (providing testimony of Marvin Greer, M.D.); Jay Wolfson,
Guardian Ad Litem for Theresa Marie Schiavo, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO (Dec. 1, 2003),
available at http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/WolfsonReport.pdf.
97 See Last Visit Narrative from Attorney Barbara Weller, a member of the
Schindlers' legal team (Mar. 19, 2005) (on file with author). Ms. Weller's narrative
recounts her effort to elicit a reaction from Terri:
I stood up and leaned over Terri. I took her arms in both of my hands. I said
to her, "Terri if you could only say 'I want to live' this whole thing could be over
today." I begged her to try very hard to say, "I want to live." To my enormous
shock and surprise, Terri's eyes opened wide, she looked me square in the face,
and with a look of great concentration, she said, "Ahhhhhhh." Then, seeming
to summon up all the strength she had, she virtually screamed, "Waaaaaaaa."
She yelled so loudly that Michael Vitadamo, Suzanne's husband, and the
female police officer who were then standing together outside Terri's door,
clearly heard her. At that point, Terri had a look of anguish on her face that I
had never seen before and she seemed to be struggling hard, but was unable to
complete the sentence. She became very frustrated and began to cry.
Id.
98 Owen et al., supra note 2, at 1402.
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I ask the reader to consider these possibilities, not because I
am convinced that Terri Schiavo had any "islands of preserved
brain function." No one can know for certain whether she did or
did not. Technology existed to measure brain function. It could
have been used, but it was not. Nor do I suggest that the
experts who stood ready to assist the Schindlers' legal team in
the planned habeas corpus proceeding would have agreed that
the technology available in early 2005 would have "provide[d] a
means for detecting conscious awareness in patients who are
assumed to be vegetative yet retain cognitive abilities that have
evaded detection using [the] standard clinical methods" 99 that
were employed by the neurologists in the Schiavo case. We will
never know the answer to that question either. The autopsy
report specifically rejects any assertion that it is possible to
make a post-mortem diagnosis concerning Terri Schiavo's post-
injury brain function. °° Those who nevertheless point to the
post-mortem size and weight of her brain, including the Chief
Medical Examiner, conveniently ignore the fact that the cause of
death was dehydration-a process that causes shrinkage in all
body tissues.1 ' My proposal goes to the ethics of effective
representation in cases involving persons with brain injuries
and consciousness disorders.
Rule 1.14(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct requires the lawyers for such patients-or those who
are seeking to protect their interests-to "take reasonably
necessary protective action, including consulting with
individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to
protect the client."'1 2 This would include, among other things, a
demand that the patient be represented by her own counsel, and
9 Id. (reporting on the case of a twenty-three-year-old woman who sustained a
severe traumatic brain injury in an automobile accident, and their successful attempt to
test their hypothesis that she could respond "through her brain activity, rather than
through speech or movement.").
100 See supra note 17 (discussing autopsy report); see also infra note 141 (discussing
autopsy report).
101 See Mayo Clinic.com, Dehydration, available at
http://www.mayoclinic.com/print/dehydration/DSOO561/DSECTION=
all&METHOD=print (last accessed March 9, 2009).
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2006).
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that testimony be adduced that develops facts about the
patient's condition that rest on the state-of-the-art diagnostic
tools available at the time of the trial.
The Schindlers' trial team attempted to convince the
guardianship court, Florida's Governor and Legislature, the
Florida Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United
States, the President and Congress, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals that Terri Schiavo was entitled to a fair
trial. At a minimum, such a trial would have explored:
(1) Terri's physical and cognitive condition and responses;
(2) The efficacy of state-of-the-art rehabilitation techniques
for patients assumed to be in a persistent vegetative
state;
(3) The physical, psychological, and emotional responses of
patients who are dying from lack of nutrition or
hydration; and
(4) Testimony from leading experts in the field of
consciousness disorders.
But it was not to be. On March 9, 2005, the guardianship
court denied a "Motion for Relief from Judgment Pending
Contemporary Medical-Psychiatric-Rehabilitative Evaluation of
Theresa Marie Schiavo. '1 °3  Judge Greer's opinion expressed
confidence in "guardian ad litem Wolfson's report in which he
found the evidence of PVS to be compelling." 104 It was a
revealing observation, for it captures perfectly the profound
practical wisdom of Sharon Begley's observation that "[s]cience
doesn't work the way newspapers might have you believe."105
Though he has an impressive r6sum6, 1°0 I will never
103 See Order of March 9, 2005, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (denying Motion for Relief from Judgment Pending Contemporary
Medical-Psychiatric-Rehabilitative Evaluation of Theresa Marie Schiavo).
104 Id. at 5.
105 Begley, supra note 78, at 122.
106 See University of South Florida, Jay Wolfson, Dr.P.H., J.D.
http://health.usf.edu/publichealth/eohJjwolfson/index.htm (last accessed Mar. 12, 2009).
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understand why the circuit court appointed Dr. Jay Wolfson as
Terri Schiavo's guardian ad litem during the stay ordered by
Governor Bush. Dr. Wolfson is neither a medical doctor, nor a
neuroscientist, nor an expert in consciousness disorders. Even if
it had been possible for him to review the entire, fifteen-year
medical record in the short time he had to evaluate the case,
there is nothing in his report or curriculum vitae from which one
could infer any expertise, education, or training that would
qualify him as an expert qualified to give a professional opinion
regarding the state of Terri Schiavo's consciousness. 10 7 A close
reading of his report discloses exactly what one might expect
from an expert who has a doctorate in public health and a law
degree:10 8  a restatement of the conclusions of the medical
experts who testified before Judge Greer. What we needed was
an unbiased, and searching, consultative process that involved
experts on the cutting edge of research on disorders of
consciousness.
Unfortunately, it is not "news" to report that the law is slow
to accept advances in science that could cast doubt on the res
judicata effect of a judgment. In the early years of DNA testing,
the Florida courts routinely rejected requests for DNA tests by
defense counsel in death penalty cases because of doubts
involving their reliability. 9 In Schiavo, the accepted wisdom
107 See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 23, at 30, where Dr. Wolfson reports that:
In the month during which the GAL conducted research, interviews and
compiled information, he sought to visit with Theresa as often as possible,
sometimes daily, and sometimes, more than once each day. During that time,
the GAL was not able to independently determine that there were consistent,
repetitive, intentional, reproducible interactive and aware activities. When
Theresa's mother and father were asked to join the GAL, there was no success
in eliciting specific responses. Hours of observed video tape recordings of
Theresa offer little objective insight about her awareness and interactive
behaviors. There are instances where she appears to respond specifically to
her mother. But these are not repetitive or consistent. There were instances
during the GAL's visits, when responses seemed possible, but they were not
consistent in any way.
This having been said, Theresa has a distinct presence about her .... This is
the confusing thing for the lay person about persistent vegetative states.
108 Id.
109 See Benedict P. Kuehne, Criminal Law and Procedure: 1993 Survey of Florida
Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 235, 259 (1993). Noting the discrepancy between the "general
acceptance" test for the admission of scientific evidence applied in Robinson v. Florida,
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from the beginning of the trial through the coroner's final report
was that Terri's physical condition was a good proxy for her
cognitive abilities. Her physical condition was known at the
time of the trial and subsequent hearings, and all of the experts
assumed that nothing could have been done to change it.
One of the great tragedies of the Schiavo case is that the art
and science of neurology were being revolutionized by advances
in diagnostic imaging during the final years of the Schiavo case.
Advanced techniques in rehabilitation medicine were finally
focusing on rebuilding the neural pathways that had atrophied
from nonuse. The "advocacy gap" created by the lack of a
guardian ad litem represented by counsel for Terri alone thus
created a "knowledge gap" that allowed the court to rely on a
parade of well-known experts who were, themselves, mired in
the "conventional wisdom," and a "high quality CT scan" of the
physical structure of Terri Schiavo's brain that told the court
absolutely nothing about the possibility that there might be
"islands of cognition" discoverable by more advanced imaging
techniques. 1 ' As Begley observes:
610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (admissibility of DNA testing in capital case), and the
approach taken by the Supreme Court of the United States under Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the author provided the following:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must
determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is
proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue.
Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)).
110 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is only one such technique. See
Nicholas D. Schiff, Multimodal Neuroimaging Approaches to Disorders Of Consciousness,
21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 388, abstract (Sept.-Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16983224 (last accessed Mar. 10, 2009):
Multimodal neuroimaging studies using positron emission tomography
techniques, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and quantitative
electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography quantify variations of
residual cerebral activity across these patient populations. The results suggest
models to distinguish the pathophysiologic basis of VS and MCS. Less clear are
potential brain mechanisms underlying late recovery of communication in rare
MCS patients. Diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging studies and recent
experimental findings suggest that structural remodeling of the brain following
severe injury may play a role in late functional recoveries ....
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If you are attacking the dogma [of neuroscience], you don't
make a lot of friends .... [The rejection of neuroplasticity is]
yet another dogma that is now in the dustbin of history ....
This was yet another case where science has deemed
something impossible without really ruling it out
empirically.
111
The "conventional wisdom" regarding brain structure,
cognitive function, and neural plasticity died hard.112 As late as
2006, "[t]he rehab community was united in opposition to the
idea that therapy after a stroke could reverse the neurological
effects of the infarct," and "'[t]he official position of the American
Stroke Association was that rehab for patients with chronic
stroke only increases a patient's muscular strength and
confidence,' but does nothing to address the brain damage."" 3
When advocacy organizations of the stature of the American
Stroke Association were willing to assert-in the face of
convincing evidence to the contrary-that rehabilitation of
stroke victims was a fool's errand, we can begin to understand
the reasons why "[t]he vegetative state is one of the least
understood and most ethically troublesome conditions in modern
medicine.""' 4
Because neuroplasticity and the power of mind and mental
training effect changes in the very structure and function of
our brain, free will and moral responsibility become
meaningful in a way that they have not been for some time in
the scientific West .... The conscious act of thinking about
one's thoughts in a different way changes the very brain
circuits that do that thinking .... As the discoveries of
neuroplasticity, and this self-directed neuroplasticity, trickle
111 Interview by Ira Flatow with Sharon Begley, science reporter for The Wall Street
Journal and author of TRAIN YOUR MIND, CHANGE YOUR BRAIN, in National Public
Radio, Science Friday (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/2007/Feb/hour2_020207.html (follow link for mp3
file of brain interview) (last accessed Feb. 3, 2007).
112 See Letter from Stephen J. Nelson, Chief Medical Examiner, 10th Judicial Circuit
of Florida, to Jon R. Thogmartin, District 6 Medical Examiner 9 (June 8, 2005)
(Neuropathology Report) in THOGMARTIN, supra note 4, at 20.
113 Begley, supra note 78, at 121.
114 Owen et al., supra note 2.
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down to clinics and schools and plain old living rooms, the
ability to willfully change the brain will become a central part
of our lives-and of our understanding of what it means to be
human. 115
III. TOWARDS A MODEL OF ETHICAL PROFESSIONALISM
Doctors, nurses, allied health-care professionals, and
researchers from every profession have weighty professional
responsibilities. These duties do not exist in the abstract. They
arise from and govern the relationships formed with those who
need, and rely upon their knowledge, expertise, good judgment,
and artistry.
116
It is impossible to understand the claims made on Terri
Schiavo's behalf by her parents in the final stages of the case, or
the lengths to which the political branches of the State of
Florida and the United States government went in their
attempts to vindicate this young woman's right to a fair trial,
without also understanding that none of these efforts would
have been necessary had the courts and the media been open to
the possibility that the conventional wisdom was-as it almost
always is-wrong. James L. Bernat put it this way:
The findings of Eric Racine and colleagues in this issue of
Neurology are important to understand how the media
accounts of her case shaped public opinion. They found that
articles published by print media outlets frequently contained
scientific inaccuracies, inconsistent diagnostic and descriptive
terminology, mismatches between the descriptions of her state
and the medical terms used to characterize it, inaccurate
prognoses, an inability to distinguish expert opinion from
diatribe, and emotionally or politically charged language
misleadingly describing end-of-life care. Sadly, media attempts
to define and explain disorders of consciousness were
115 Begley, supra note 68, at 253-54.
116 See, e.g., Michael D. Bayless, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2nd ed., Wadsworth 1989);
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., Oxford
University Press 2001); THE CRISIS OF CARE: Affirming and Restoring Caring Practices
in the Helping Professions (Susan S. Phillips & Patricia Benner eds., Georgetown
University Press 1994).
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infrequent.
... But the most serious media shortcoming was squandering
the opportunity to educate the public about disorders of
consciousness and end-of-life care. The power of the media to
mold public opinion imparts a duty for them to conduct public
education.
1 17
The same holds true for lawyers and judges. At the center
of all of our respective professional endeavors is a human
person-a patient, a client, a research subject, or a party who
has an interest in the outcome of our efforts. We must be free,
we argue, to perform our respective duties as professionals
because both "skill" and "judgment" are a uniquely personal
combination of art and science:
Every science touches art at some points-every art has its
scientific side; the worst man of science is he who is never an
artist, and the worst artist is he who is never a man of science.
In early times, medicine was an art, which took its place at the
side of poetry and painting; today they try to make a science of
it, placing it beside mathematics, astronomy, and physics.
11 8
A similar combination of art and science explains the
profoundly important role that lawyers and judges play in the
117 James L. Bernat, Editorial, Theresa Schiavo's Tragedy, and Ours Too, 71
NEUROLOGY 964, 964-65 (Sept. 23, 2008); see also Timothy Johnson, Shattuck Lecture;
Medicine and the Media, 339 NEw ENGLAND J MED. 87 (July 9, 1998). The article
referenced by the Bernat editorial, Eric Racine et al., 71 NEUROLOGY 1027, 1030 (2008)
expands on the point made in the text:
Given the centrality of the PVS diagnosis in the Schiavo case, our results
highlight areas critical for the public understanding of the CDCs (chronic
disorders of consciousness). The results confirm concerns expressed in the
peer-review literature that media coverage of the case of Terri Schiavo
included both inaccurate statements about her diagnosis and charged language
about EOL (end-of-life) decision-making (references: Perry, J.E., Churchill,
L.R., Kirshner, H.S., The Terri Schiavo case: legal, ethical, and medical
perspectives. Ann Intern Med 2005; 143: 744-748 and Quill, T.E., Terri
Schiavo: a tragedy compounded. N EngI J Med 2005; 352:1630-1633).
Id. (referencing James L. Bernat, Chronic Disorders of Consciousness, 367 THE LANCET
1181 (2006)).
118 A.L. Wynman, Endpiece-Medicine: Art or Science, 320 British Med. J. 1322
(2000) (quoting ARMAND TROUSSEAU, LECTURES ON CLINICAL MEDICINE (Vol. 2, The New
Syndeham Society 1869)).
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regulation of health care. By law and the ethics of their
profession, lawyers are the gatekeepers and administrators of
the justice system. We serve as the civil and criminal
investigators, evaluators, and '"judges"' of first instance. It is
our responsibility to ensure that no case under our control
proceeds to a judge, or to a grand or petit jury, unless the
evidence supporting the alleged grievance, crime, or defense is
both admissible in court and strong enough to withstand the
rigors of cross-examination. 19 As the "arbiter of facts and law
for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of
government under the rule of law,"'2 ° the judge is legally and
ethically obligated to "administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.... "1 2 1
Read together, the ethics of both law and medicine thus
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the boundary between law
and medicine is defined by the consistent application of a rule of
reason to the facts and circumstances of each case. 122 Because
duty is our common calling, a "professional responsibility" (or
"duty") model provides a powerful and precision-crafted lens
through which to examine any decision, act, or omission by a
legal or medical professional.
Viewed through this lens rather than the "real-time" glare
of the twenty-four hour news cycle, the Schiavo case is a
textbook example of questionable behavior across the board.
IV. THE ETHICS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN
119 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006).
120 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (2007).
121 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2007). The material quoted in the text is drawn from chapter 28,
section 453 of the United States Code, which prescribes the Oath of Office for each judge
or justice of the United States. See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3
(2006).
122 Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Auth., [1998] A.C. 232 (H.L.) (holding that
"there are cases where, despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning the defendants'
conduct, the defendant can properly be held liable for negligence ... [when] it cannot be
demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction that the body of opinion relied upon is
reasonable or responsible."). Justice Farquharson made much the same point in the jury
instructions delivered in R. v. Arthur, [1981] 12 B.M.L.R. 1 ('There is no special law in
this country that places doctors in a separate category and gives them extra protection
over the rest of us.").
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DISPUTED PROCEEDINGS TO WITHDRAW NUTRITION AND
HYDRATION FROM BRAIN-INJURED PATIENTS
A. The Role of the Courts in a Disputed Guardianship Case
Properly understood, the law provides a framework within
which those who are empowered to decide difficult medical
questions can do so without fear of criminal or civil liability. In
the Anglo-American common law tradition that prevails in the
United Kingdom, the Commonwealth countries, and the United
States, the courts provide a forum for the formal and final
resolution of public and private disputes, including those
involving medical care.
In an ideal world, disputes among family members,
between physicians and their patients, or among partisans in
the field of medical or biological research would be rare.
Unfortunately, they are all too common, and when one of the
parties to such a dispute invokes the power of the court to
resolve it, the "justice" of the outcome will depend not only on
the strength of their respective medical and legal positions, but
also on the quality of the legal process itself.
This point cannot be over-emphasized. The role of the
judge is to preside over an adversarial hearing in which the
parties and their counsel, not the court, must shoulder the
burden of presenting enough facts to permit either the judge or a
jury to resolve the factual issues in dispute. Where cases
involve difficult questions relating to diagnosis or treatment, the
law will often defer to medical experts, but judicial deference
cannot be assumed. The parties must prove, to the satisfaction
of the judge, that the law provides a remedy (including
deference) under the circumstances.1 23 As a result, the duty of a
legal guardian, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, or counsel for one
of the parties is to get as many of the relevant facts on the table
as possible. If there is a default by any one of the parties to a
case, the quality of justice will suffer.
123 Compare FLA. STAT. § 764.361 (2007) (discussing powers of guardian); with §
765.401 (discussing powers of proxy in the absence of an advance directive); § 765.404
(discussing persons in a persistent vegetative state).
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This article proposes that inquiries of this type are best
conducted in the language of professional ethics. The
professional norms common to criminal and civil cases provide
not only a set of readily accessible and commonly accepted
definitions of the rights and obligations of those having an
interest in the outcome, but they also provide a powerful lens
through which we can analyze the often-erroneous factual
assumptions that drive the "conventional wisdom."
B. The Relevance of the Law of Homicide
"Homicide" is defined by the common law as "the killing of
one person by another." '124 It has two purposes: 1) to protect the
living from homicidal acts or omissions; and 2) to protect those
who become parties to a post-mortem inquiry into the reasons
why a specific death occurred. Florida law does not expressly
define the term homicide, 12 5 but it does impose criminal liability
for specific acts or omissions. 126 In most cases, the physician's
role is limited to making the initial determination that the
patient has died and filing the appropriate death certificate.
1 27
If the cause of death is extraordinary in any way, such as by
violence or under unusual circumstances, the medical examiner
or coroner has the authority "to perform, or have performed,
whatever autopsies or laboratory examinations he or she deems
necessary and in the public interest to determine the
identification of or cause or manner of death of the deceased or
to obtain evidence necessary for forensic examination[,]" and,
thereafter, to make it available to the appropriate legal
authorities. 128
124 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (8th ed. 2004).
125 Florida Statutes section 775.01 provides that "[tihe common law of England in
relation to crimes, except so far as the same relates to the modes and degrees of
punishment, shall be of full force in this state where there is no existing provision by
statute on the subject."
126 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.03 (excusable homicide); § 782.04 (murder); § 782.07
(manslaughter); § 782.071 (vehicular homicide); § 782.08 (assisting in self-murder,
defined in § 781.081(1)(b) as "the voluntary and intentional taking of one's own life. As
used in this section, the term includes attempted self-murder.').
127 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 382.008 (2007).
128 See, e.g., FLA. STAT § 406.11 (2007).
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There are only two situations in American law in which the
execution of a judicial decree authorizes acts taken with the
express intention of causing death. The first is the death
penalty;129  the other is a judicial decree authorizing families,
physicians, or medical facilities to withhold or terminate life-
sustaining care from an incompetent person. 130
Laws authorizing the execution of a death sentence make it
clear that capital punishment is an exception to the general rule
prohibiting acts or omissions "perpetrated from a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or any human
being .... ,,13' Because death is a sentencing option in these
cases, the law requires effective representation of counsel 32 and
other procedural safeguards that are supposed to ensure that
the trial, appeals, and sentencing are conducted fairly.133 If the
sentence is actually carried out, the law also requires that the
method of execution be neither cruel nor unusual. 134
129 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.105(1) (2007) ("A death sentence shall be executed by
lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be executed
by electrocution. The sentence shall be executed under the direction of the Secretary of
Corrections or the secretary's designee.").
130 Laws expressly authorizing euthanasia at the request of a competent patient are
distinguishable from the execution of a judicial decree ordering an act or omission
intended to cause death. Assisted suicide statutes immunize, under certain conditions,
actions that might otherwise make them accessories to homicide. See O.R.S. §161.155
(2009). Section 127.805 of Oregon's assisted suicide statute, O.R.S. §§127.000-127.897
(2009), authorizes an adult who is certified by a physician to be terminally ill "to make a
written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner." Fully informed consent, verified in writing by the physician, is
required. O.R.S. §§ 127.820, 127.825, 125.830 (2009).
131 FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2007) (defining "murder"). Compare § 922.105(5)-(8)
(creating an exception to the general rule defining "murder" to exclude the acts or
omissions necessary to execute a death sentence).
132 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening
of Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
827 (2003).
133 See generally Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened,
What It Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2005).
134 Compare FLA. STAT. § 922.105(8) (2007) ("In any case in which an execution
method is declared unconstitutional, the death sentence shall remain in force until the
sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method of execution."); with § 782.03
("Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful
act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, ...
and not done in a cruel or unusual manner."). See generally Philip R. Nugent, Pulling
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
A judicial decree authorizing acts or omissions that will
inevitably result in the death of an incompetent person presents
equally difficult legal and judicial ethics issues.135 Death is not
only the inevitable consequence of such decrees; it is, in many
cases, the intended result. Even though the law and many
commentators draw a distinction in such cases between acts or
omissions, or between direct and indirect effects, the fact
remains that:
[I]n many termination of treatment cases, it is specious to say
that death is unintended. That explanation makes sense in
administration of pain medication that is foreseeably lethal. It
is also true where the decision to terminate life support is
genuinely directed to the treatment, independent of its role in
keeping the patient alive .... But this reasoning does not
apply to many decisions to cease a life-sustaining procedure.
Often what the patients or the families want to end are lives so
impoverished and hopeless that they are judged not worth
living. Despite repeated rejection of suicide and euthanasia,
judicial decisions approving the right to such terminations
make clear the judges' own sympathies with this judgment.
The miserable existence suffered by the patient (apart from the
procedure to be ended) is often described in heart-breaking
detail.136
the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 185 (1993).
135 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2007).
136 Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in American Law, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 693, 714 (2006) (internal citations omitted). The Florida courts
provided just such detail in Schiavo:
The evidence is overwhelming that Theresa is in a permanent or persistent
vegetative state. It is important to understand that a persistent vegetative
state is not simply a coma. She is not asleep. She has cycles of apparent
wakefulness and apparent sleep without any cognition or awareness. As she
breathes, she often makes moaning sounds. Theresa has severe contractures of
her hands, elbows, knees, and feet. Over the span of this last decade, Theresa's
brain has deteriorated because of the lack of oxygen it suffered at the time of
the heart attack. By mid 1996, the CAT scans of her brain showed a severely
abnormal structure. At this point, much of her cerebral cortex is simply gone
and has been replaced by cerebral spinal fluid. Medicine cannot cure this
condition. Unless an act of God, a true miracle, were to recreate her brain,
Theresa will always remain in an unconscious, reflexive state, totally
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It is clear from an examination of the record and published
opinions in the Schiavo case that the stated justification for the
orders entered by the Probate Court was that Terri had told her
husband's relatives that she would not want to be maintained in
a severely incapacitated condition.137 It is also clear that this
alleged desire was the one that the Probate Court of Pinellas
County Florida sought to effectuate in Terri Schiavo's case. 1 8
Consider the sequence of the orders entered by the court:139
0 The decree of February 11, 2000, authorized the guardian,
Michael Schiavo, to "proceed with the discontinuance of
said artificial life support for Theresa Marie Schiavo. ' 4 °
Such a decree is not, by its terms, an order authorizing
acts or omissions that will inevitably result in the death
of the incompetent ward. Although death may well result
from the discontinuance of artificial life support, it is
dependent upon others to feed her and care for her most private needs. She
could remain in this state for many years.
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Schiavo 1)
(internal citations omitted).
137 See Transcript of Trial at 372, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2000) (testimony of Mary Schindler on January 25, 2000); Excerpts
of Trial at 53-90, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
11, 2000) (testimony of Diane Myer on January 26, 2000, and testimony of Michael
Schiavo, Scott Schiavo, and Joan Schiavo). The trial court also heard the testimony from
a priest who had never met Terri, apparently in order to establish that the views
attributed to Terri were consistent with Terri's personal faith and the stated position of
the Catholic Church on withholding nutrition and hydration. Transcript of Trial at 178-
223, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000), available at
http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/
schiavo/doc files/Testimony-of FatherGerard Murphy.doc, at 28, 36-37 (testimony of
Father Gerard Murphy: "Have you had the opportunity to meet Mr. and Mrs. Schindler?
A: No. I regret that. I wish I were their pastor. Q: Have you had the opportunity to meet
Theresa Schiavo in this case? A: No .... Q: So in this case, have you had the benefit of
any of the other family's ... A. No .... Q: -- thoughts on this? A: No ... ").
138 Schiavo 1, 780 So. 2d at 180 ("Her statements to her friends and family about the
dying process were few and they were oral. Nevertheless, those statements, along with
other evidence about Theresa, gave the trial court a sufficient basis to make this decision
for her.").
139 All references to court orders are to the guardianship case: In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
140 Order of February 11, 2000, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (emphasis added).
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always possible that a person sustained by artificial
nutrition and hydration can survive by ingesting food and
water by mouth. Whether, and at what point, oral
ingestion would have been possible for Terri Schiavo in
late 2003 and in 2005 is a matter of some dispute.
141
* The decree dated September 17, 2003, by contrast,
directed that the guardian, Michael Schiavo, "shall cause
the removal of the nutrition and hydration tube from the
Ward, Theresa Marie Schiavo. 142 That particular tube
was removed pursuant to the court's order. 143  In
accordance with the Executive Order authorized by
"Terri's Law," another tube was inserted later. The
Governor's action precipitated the litigation in Schiavo v.
Bush.
* The final decree issued by Judge Greer on February 25,
2005, directed "that the guardian, Michael Schiavo, shall
cause the removal of nutrition and hydration from the
141 The autopsy takes the position that oral nutrition and hydration would have been
impossible given the condition of Terri's throat musculature at the time of her death
from dehydration. THOGMARTIN, supra note 4, at 7, Question #3. The family, by
contrast, argues that, with proper rehabilitation and training, Terri could have been
taught to swallow, and there were indications in the medical records that she had, in the
early 1990s, both taken liquids and responded on one occasion to a question.
In this regard, the Medical Examiner and the family are talking past each other. The
Medical Examiner's Report describes only the condition of the body after death and
draws a careful distinction between a medical diagnosis and a post-mortem examination.
The family's position, by contrast, focuses on their longstanding argument that the
failure to provide rehabilitation services after the diagnosis of PVS was medical neglect.
This argument may well be supported by advances in rehabilitation medicine and the
scientific community's increasing awareness that the neuroplasticity of the brain makes
it possible to regain physical and mental functions that were once thought to be
irreversibly lost due to trauma or disease. See, e.g., SHARON BEGLEY, TRAIN YOUR MIND,
CHANGE YOUR BRAIN: HOW A NEW SCIENCE REVEALS OUR EXTRAORDINARY POTENTIAL TO
TRANSFORM OURSELVES (Ballantine Books, 2006); and JEFFREY M. SCHWARTZ & SHARON
BEGLEY, THE MIND AND THE BRAIN: NEUROPLASTICITY AND THE POWER OF MENTAL
FORCE (Harper Collins 2002).
142 Order of September 17, 2003, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2003) (emphasis added).
143 See Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003) (noting that "the action of
withholding or withdrawing nutrition or hydration from a patient in a permanent
vegetative state has already occurred."), available at
http://news.findlaw.comfhdocs/docs/schiavolflagovexord03201.html.
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ward, Theresa Schiavo. 144  This order was
unquestionably designed to ensure that Terri Schiavo's
life would end-a point underscored by Judge Greer's
ruling on the "Emergency Expedited Motion to Provide
Theresa Schiavo with Food and Water by Natural
Means" filed on February 28, 2005, by Terri's parents,
Robert and Mary Schindler. 145  In that motion, Terri's
parents asked that they be permitted to provide food and
water to their daughter by mouth.146 Judge Greer denied
the motion on March 8, 2005, because, in his view, their
request was the medical equivalent of "asking for an
experimental procedure. 147  A police guard was then
posted outside Terri's room in order to ensure that no
fluids were provided. 
141
Because section 782.03 of the Florida Statutes excuses only
acts taken "by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and
without any unlawful intent,... and not done in a cruel or
unusual manner[,]" the timing and manner of death is relevant.
In Terri Schiavo's case, "[p]ostmortem findings, including the
state of the body and laboratory testing, show that she died of
marked dehydration (a direct complication of the electrolyte
disturbances brought about by the lack of hydration).1 49 Were
the patient capable of experiencing the pain and mental anguish
that would attend such a horrible demise, there would be no
144 Order of February 25, 2005, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005) (emphasis added). But see infra text accompanying note 149.
145 Order of March 8, 2005, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2005).
146 Emergency Expedited Motion to Provide Theresa Schiavo with Food and Water by
Natural Means, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
28, 2005).
147 Order of March 8, 2005, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. March 8, 2005).
148 See Anne Lindenberg, In Schiavo Case, Police Rely on Professionalism, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 11, 2005, at Largo Times 3.
149 THOGMARTIN, supra note 4, at 39, p. 8, Question 7 ('By what mechanism did
Theresa Schiavo die?"). Because the Medical Examiner could not determine the cause of
the "severe anoxic brain injury ... with reasonable medical certainty[, the] manner of
death will therefore be certified as undetermined."); id. at 39, p. 9, Question 8 ("What
was the cause and manner of death?").
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doubt that utilizing such a method for ending the person's life
would be "cruel and unusual"-if not barbaric. Theresa
Schiavo's actual cognitive abilities at the time of her death were
thus a critically important-but unknown-fact.15
0
C. Comparing the Substantive and Procedural Requirements in
Capital Punishment and Disputed Withdrawal of Treatment
Cases
In Florida v. Davis,"' the Florida Supreme Court made the
following statement concerning the unique nature of cases in
which a judicial decree will result in death:
As the United States Supreme Court first stated more than twenty-five years
ago, "death is different in kind1 om any other punishment imposed under our
system of criminal justice."[ ] We have acknowledged that "death is
different" in recognizing the need for effective counsel in capital proceedip~s
"from the perspective of both the sovereign state and the defending citizen."M
Terri Schiavo was not dead when these orders were
entered. She was incapacitated and uniquely vulnerable, but
also entitled as a matter of Florida constitutional law to have a
surrogate exercise her right to decide whether to continue
further nutrition and hydration.'54  Florida lawmakers
responded to the problems created by the concept of "substituted
judgment" by creating a conditional immunity for those involved
in the inquiry. As long as health care facilities, providers,
surrogates, and proxies follow the procedures prescribed in
Chapter 765 of the Florida Statutes, and there is a finding,
based on clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacitated
person had given some indication that he or she would have
refused life-sustaining treatment under the circumstances, the
150 Id. at 39, p. 8, Questions 5 ("Was Mrs. Schiavo in a persistent vegetative state?")
and 6 ("What diagnoses can be made in regards to the brain of Mrs. Schiavo?").
151 Florida v. Davis, 872 So. 2d 250, 254 (Fla. 2004).
152 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)). Also in support of this
proposition, the court cited Florida v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973) (stating that
because "[d]eath is a unique punishment in its finality and in its total rejection of the
possibility of rehabilitation .... the Legislature has chosen to reserve its application to
only the most aggravated and unmitigated of most serious crimes.").
153 Davis, 872 So. 2d at 255 (quoting Sheppard & White, P.A. v. Jacksonville, 827 So.
2d 925, 932 (Fla. 2002)).
154 In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1990).
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surrogate may act. 155  That immunity, however, is expressly
conditioned on two factors. The first is compliance with specific
due process requirements. The second is the development of
factual findings concerning the incapacitated person's physical,
mental, or and cognitive condition.
Careful examination of the procedural requirements in
capital cases and disputed withdrawal of treatment cases leaves
little doubt that Florida law treats all cases in which judges are
asked to authorize actions or omissions that would otherwise be
subject to prosecution under the laws governing homicide as
"death cases. 156 There are, however, important differences.
In a capital punishment case, the defendant is usually
competent to stand trial and can participate in the defense of his
or her case. There is an extensive body of constitutional and
statutory law that mandates "effective assistance of counsel,"
and a vocal-and growing-group of individuals and
organizations who are willing and able to delay execution of a
death sentence for years in order to ensure that the trial was
conducted fairly and that the court's findings of fact are
objectively verifiable (i.e., that the defendant is actually
guilty).
157
155 FLA. STAT. § 765.109 (2007) (discussing immunity from liability).
156 Section 765.401(3) of the Florida Statutes requires that substituted judgment
proceedings comply with section 765.205, which defines the powers of the surrogate
decision-maker, and section 765.305, which deals with procedure where there is no
advance directive. Both statutes contemplate compliance with Chapter 744 (governing
guardians and their powers), as well as the possibility that life-sustaining treatment can
be withdrawn, even in the absence of evidence concerning the patient's wishes, in cases
where the patient is in a persistent vegetative state. See FLA. STAT. § 765.404 (2007).
157 The Innocence Project is an excellent and inspirational example of an organization
that seeks to ensure that individuals are not wrongly convicted. It was founded in 1992,
by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at
Yeshiva University, to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA
testing. This path-breaking, nonprofit legal clinic's efforts have now been duplicated at
law schools throughout the country. Its website accurately observes that the facts and
procedural issues of each case are unique, but that examination of the cases in which
mistakes have been found show that there are a number of common issues: "[1]
Unreliable or Limited Science[; 2] False Confessions[; 3] Forensic Science Fraud or
Misconduct[; 4] Government Misconduct[; 5] Informants or Snitches[; and 6] Bad
Lawyering." See The Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand (last accessed, Mar. 5, 2009).
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The Schiavo case proves that precisely the opposite can be
true in a disputed "substituted judgment" case. The client is
under a severe "disability" as that term is understood in both
civil rights law and legal ethics. The disability that gives rise to
the claim that treatment should not continue makes it
impossible for the incapacitated person to participate in a trial
or to indicate his or her present preferences in any way.
Although Florida prescribed almost exactly the same procedural
safeguards for such cases as it does in capital punishment
cases, 158 the courts were willing either to dispense with them, or
to view them as impediments standing in the way of effectuating
the court's decision that the incapacitated wards would have
chosen to refuse life-sustaining care under the circumstances. 59
158 In section 744.1012 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature expressed its
intent as follows:
Recognizing that every individual has unique needs and differing abilities, the
Legislature declares that it is the purpose of [the Guardianship Statute] to
promote the public welfare by establishing a system that permits incapacitated
persons to participate as fully as possible in all decisions affecting them; that
assists such persons in meeting the essential requirements for their physical
health and safety, in protecting their rights, in managing their financial
resources, and in developing or regaining their abilities to the maximum extent
possible; and that accomplishes these objectives through providing, in each
case, the form of assistance that least interferes with the legal capacity of a
person to act in her or his own behalf.
Florida Statutes section 765.102(1) states the legislative intent of Florida's Advance
Directive Statutes:
(1) The Legislature finds that every competent adult has the fundamental right
of self-determination regarding decisions pertaining to his or her own health,
including the right to choose or refuse medical treatment. This right is subject
to certain interests of society, such as the protection of human life and the
preservation of ethical standards in the medical profession.
The Florida Declaration of Rights provides explicit protection for the "Rights of Accused
and Victims." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16. Section 17 provides detailed guidance concerning
the legality of the death penalty and the manner in which it is to be executed. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 17 ("Excessive Punishments").
1s9 Among other omissions, Terri Schiavo was never represented by counsel whose
independent professional judgment was not compromised by either real or apparent
conflicts with the interests of her husband and guardian, Michael Schiavo, or those of
the Schindler family, who sought to have Mr. Schiavo removed as guardian. See, e.g., In
re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (order
authorizing payment of interim cost advance to attorney); In re Guardianship of Schiavo,
No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 11, 1998) (order authorizing payment of cost
retainer to attorney instituting action regarding withdrawal of life support systems); In
re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 14, 1997) (order
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When Terri's parents and pro-life activists stepped forward to
question the procedural fairness of the trial, they were described
not as zealous guardians of the right to a fair trial and the rights
of the accused, but as "those who wanted to keep [Terri] alive
indefinitely-including her elderly parents" and "politicized
religious forces [who] were responsible for the international
attention garnered by Mrs. Schiavo's plight and the escalation of
her cause to a culture war flashpoint."'6 ° And when Terri's
family asked that state-of-the-art diagnostics, such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), be used to test her actual,
as opposed to assumed, cognitive state, the court refused the
request. 161
V. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE FACTS OF A CASE AND THE
"RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS"
I joined the Terri Schiavo case as appellate co-counsel in
the Florida Supreme Court 162 for Florida Governor Jeb Bush in
early August, 2004. Later that month, after having immersed
myself in the trial record and all of the briefs filed to that point,
I argued the case for the constitutionality of "Terri's Law"'
163 and
the Governor's October 2003 Executive Order restoring the
nutrition and hydration tube sustaining Terri Schiavo's life
164
authorizing guardian to employ and pay an attorney).
160 Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Bio-Politics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric, Terri
Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553 (2006).
161 See Order Denying FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.540(b)(5) Motion for Relief from Judgment
Pending Contemporary Medical-Psychiatric-Rehabilitative Evaluation of Theresa Marie
Schiavo of March 9, 2005, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 9, 2005) (order authorizing guardian to employ and pay an attorney). As used
in the text, the term "state of the art diagnostics" should not be equated with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In November, 1990, approximately nine months
after she collapsed, surgeons implanted a nine-centimeter-long neurological thalamic
stimulator wire in Terri Schiavo's head. It extended from the right parietal bone and
terminated in the right thalamus.
162 The case was argued in the Florida Supreme Court on August 31, 2004. The
transcript of the oral argument is available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/04-
9 2 5 .htm . The video is available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/04-08.html.
163 2003 Fla. Laws 418, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/03laws/ch_2003-418.pdf.
16 Fla. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at
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after Judge Greer's September 17, 2003, order that it be
withdrawn. 165 From that review of the record, it became clear to
me that the Schiavo case had all of the characteristics of a
problematic death penalty case: serious procedural errors,
ineffective assistance from her guardian, no assistance of
counsel, and a judge who had overstepped the proper boundaries
of his judicial role. Whatever the actual facts were in the
Schiavo case, neither I nor an appellate court, whose review
would be limited to the trial court's record, could ever know
them from that source. It is my contention that the record in the
case was developed in a seriously flawed judicial proceeding.
Throughout the later proceedings, including the federal
habeas corpus and civil rights litigation that occurred in early
2005 and the flurry of legislative activity in Congress on
legislation for the "[r]elief of the parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo[,]"'166 it was clear that the Schindler family was
litigating against a "conventional wisdom" rooted in attitudes
about the "right to die." In Schiavo, it took the form of a series
of presumptions about disputed facts, including:
(i) Terri's condition. Michael Schiavo, Terri's husband, took
inconsistent positions concerning Terri's condition.
During the medical malpractice case filed against her
primary care physician and gynecologist,' 67 Mr. Schiavo
testified that "she does feel pain"'168 and would, on
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/schiavo/flagovexordO3201.html.
165 See supra text accompanying note 142 and accompanying text.
166 Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15
(2005). The original draft of the legislation was an amendment to the federal habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §2241 (2007). That amendment would have made it clear that
persons enmeshed in disputed guardianship proceedings can be considered a "person in
custody." As finally adopted, Public Law 109-3 granted specific subject matter
jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida:
to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of
Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie
Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to
sustain her life.
Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) (emphasis added).
167 See text at notes 24-25.
168 Direct testimony of Michael Schiavo, Medical Malpractice Case, supra, note 25, at
p. 17, lines 15-19:
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occasion, swallow.169 By the time he had filed the
petition to withhold nutrition and hydration, Michael
Schiavo had changed his view. "Terri was beyond any
meaningful rescue" after suffering a massive brain injury
in 1990, and "she never had any hope of recovery."17 The
medical record, however, contained some evidence of
cognitive function, including a reference to a situation in
which Terri had responded verbally to a question posed
by a physical therapist.
171
(ii) The rejection of neuroplasticity. We will never know for
certain whether the cessation of rehabilitation harmed
Terri Schiavo's chances of recovery, but recent advances
in neuroscience support her parents' claim that
aggressive rehabilitation would have been helpful. These
advances also support the contention that the condition
of Terri's brain at death was attributable, at least in part,
to lack of stimulation, rather than the initial injury.
172
A. [A]nd I usually do a little bit of range of motion with her
Q. And while you're doing that, do you talk to her?
A. Yes, I am talking to her right now telling her it's okay
Q. She does't like it very much?
A. No, she doesn't. She does feel pain.
Id. at 23, lines 8-12:
Q. Does she express discomfort [during physical therapy]?
A. Yes. Yes, she does.
Q. How does she do that?
A. She'll moan and groan.
169 Id. at 20, lines 14-19.
170 Michael Shelden, Her Soul Had Gone, Her Body Was Ready, THE TELEGRAPH
ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2006 (discussing an interview with Michael Schiavo).
171 E-mail message from Patricia Campbell Andersen, counsel for the Schindler
family during the hearings, to Robert A. Destro, Aug. 25, 2004 (on file with the author):
"MediPlex Rehab Center in Bradenton, FL in January, 1991. Discharged in July, 1991.
While there, Terri said "no" and "stop" during vigorous physical therapy...."
172 See Letter from Stephen J. Nelson, Chief Medical Examiner, 10th Judicial Circuit
of Florida, to Jon R. Thogmartin, District 6 Medical Examiner 9 (June 8, 2005)
(Neuropathology Report) in THOGMARTIN, supra note 4 at 20 ("Neuropathologic
examination alone of the decedent's brain - or any brain, for that matter - cannot prove
or disprove a diagnosis of persistent vegetative state or minimally conscious state.").
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Both human and animal studies have shown that "the
primary motor cortex (Ml) can reorganise after a focal
vascular lesion if there is motor skill retraining. In
animals not trained after a stroke, there is a further
reduction in the size of the hand representation in M1.
''173
(iii) Lack of medical and neuroscientific understanding of the
minimally conscious state. At the time the Schiavo case
was tried in the guardianship court, it was widely
assumed that the brain, once injured, could not recover.
Today, there is a far more extensive literature on this
subject, and a far greater understanding of the
organization and functioning of the brain. At the time of
the habeas corpus proceeding in February 2005, this
literature was available, and neuroplasticity was
"generally accepted" in the scientific community. It is
unclear why the courts rejected the family's pleas that
experts be permitted to utilize appropriate, state-of-the-
art, diagnostic imaging to get an accurate picture of
Terri's brain functions, but it is safe to assume from the
"heart-breaking detail" and empathy expressed by the
judges in the various proceedings in early 2005 that, like
Michael, they had concluded that Terri's life was "so
impoverished and hopeless that [it was] judged not worth
living." '174
173 R.M. Bracewell, Editorial Commentary, Neuroplasticity and Rehabilitation,
Stroke: Neuroplasticity and Recent Approaches to Rehabilitation, 74 JOURNAL OF
NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 1465 (2003).
174 Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in American Law, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. (SUpp.) 693, 714 (2006) (internal citations omitted). The Florida courts
provided just such detail in Schiavo I, stating as follows:
The evidence is overwhelming that Theresa is in a permanent or persistent
vegetative state. It is important to understand that a persistent vegetative
state is not simply a coma. She is not asleep. She has cycles of apparent
wakefulness and apparent sleep without any cognition or awareness. As she
breathes, she often makes moaning sounds. Theresa has severe contractures of
her hands, elbows, knees, and feet.
Over the span of this last decade, Theresa's brain has deteriorated because of
the lack of oxygen it suffered at the time of the heart attack. By mid 1996, the
CAT scans of her brain showed a severely abnormal structure. At this point,
much of her cerebral cortex is simply gone and has been replaced by cerebral
spinal fluid. Medicine cannot cure this condition. Unless an act of God, a true
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(iv) The unfairness of her trial. Both the federal courts and
many post-mortem commentaries on the Schiavo case
focused on the "proceedings" in the guardianship case.
One writer even went so far as to state that:
A thorough examination of the Terri Schiavo
guardianship proceedings reveals that the judicial
process, both substantively and procedurally, achieved
a decision that was consistent with the specific facts of
Mrs. Schiavo's case and Florida's established legal
framework .... This conclusion is important because it
challenges those claims of the Religious Right that
attempted to undermine the credibility and legitimacy
of the Florida judiciary.'
75
Each of these points assumes a) that the "specific facts of
Mrs. Schiavo's case" were fully litigated; b) that the conduct of
the trial was consistent with "Florida's established legal
framework," and c) that a habeas corpus attack on the
proceedings of a guardianship court was little more than an
"attempt[ ] ... to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the
Florida judiciary. 176  The goal of the Schindler family, by
contrast, was to raise enough doubts about the fairness of the
proceeding to make a plausible case for a new trial.177 This
would have been the outcome had a federal court granted the
family's petition for a writ of habeas corpus178 or, in the
alternative, granted the new trial authorized by Congress in
Public Law 109-3.179
miracle, were to recreate her brain, Theresa will always remain in an
unconscious, reflexive state, totally dependent upon others to feed her and care
for her most private needs. She could remain in this state for many years.
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (Schiavo 1)
(internal citations omitted).
175 Perry, supra note 160, at 555.
176 Perry, supra note 160, at 555 (assuming that Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321
(Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005), was correctly decided).
177 See Petition for Certiorari, Bush v. Schiavo, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005) (No. 04-757),
2004 WL 2790640.
178 Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05-CV-522-T-30TGW, 2005 WL 754121 (M.D. Fla. Mar 18,
2005), vacated by Schiavo ex rel Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05-CV-522-T-30TGW, 2005 WL
2240351 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2005).
179 Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15
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VI. "THINKING LIKE A (GOOD) LAWYER": THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL PREDICATES ON WHICH
THE "CONVENTIONAL WISDOM" IS BASED
A number of commentators have argued, in the words of
Joshua Perry, for example, that criticism of the Florida courts
was "imprecise and irresponsible because it fail[ed] to
distinguish between the quality of the judicial process and the
outcome of the judicial process. '80
This is a rather strange criticism. The professional
responsibility (or lack thereof) of any lawyer who serves as
advocate or advisor (or both) in any civil or criminal case,
including one as high-profile as Schiavo, is-and, ethically, must
be-the starting point for an analysis of the lawyer's behavior.
A. The Duty to Make Only Good-Faith Claims
The first duty of the lawyer is to make an independent,
professional judgment1 8 1 concerning the merits of the case. This
is so because Rule 3.1 of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provides that:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
(2005). This Congressional Act granted specific subject matter jurisdiction to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida:
to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of
Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie
Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to
sustain her life.
Id. at § 1, 119 Stat. 15.
180 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 160, at 620; see also id. at 589-90 nn.160 & 163
(recounting allegedly inflammatory comments by counsel for the Schindler family and
Governor Bush).
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.").
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faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as
to require that every element of the case be established.
18 2
For many readers, and indeed for many of the judges
assigned to hear Terri's case, the claim that Terri did not get a
fair trial is somewhat counter-intuitive. The case did, after all,
take nearly fifteen years to work its way through the courts.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that none of the courts that
actually considered the case were willing to consider the fair
trial issue. Consider the following extract from the transcript of
the oral argument in Bush v. Schiavo:
CHIEF JUSTICE: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and
welcome to the Florida Supreme Court. The first case this
morning is Bush versus Schiavo. Are the parties ready?...
[MR DESTRO:] Yes, Your Honor ....
[CHIEF JUSTICE:] Before you get into your argument, the
court would appreciate it if ... you would address the
separation of powers, first, with the privacy argument, and
with whatever free time you have, you can argue the other
issues.
[MR DESTRO:] Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the
Court. Terri Schiavo did not have [a fair trial or the benefit of]
an independent [guardian ad litem represented by counsel].
JUSTICE WELLS: Let's try to get into the argument on
separation of powers .... 183
182 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1. The two states in which I am admitted
to the Bar, California and Ohio, have similar rules, as does the Florida State Bar, whose
rules govern in all legal proceedings before the courts of the State of Florida.
183 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005). The transcript is available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/04-925.htm. The bracketed material was
omitted from the transcript. Obvious misspellings of names have been corrected without
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From my perspective as appellate counsel, this was an
extraordinary (albeit expected) exchange. Lack of procedural
due process during the trial was one of the only plausible legal
theories on which a claim for relief could have been granted.
Once the guardianship court had made its initial finding that
Terri was in a "persistent vegetative state" and that she would
not want to be maintained in that condition, the only way to
attack those findings of fact was to attack the process by which
they were found. Viewed from that perspective, "Terri's Law"
and the Governor's Executive Order are similar to the non-
judicial clemency proceedings that serve as the last hope of
condemned criminals seeking to avoid the death penalty.
B. The Lawyer's Duty to a Client with Diminished Capacity
Representing an incompetent person is, even in the "best" of
times, a difficult proposition. Rule 1.14(a) of the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes
this problem when it advises that "the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client[,]" even in cases where "a client's
capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection
with a representation is diminished, whether because of
minority, mental impairment or for some other reason."
In the case of an incompetent, laws governing
guardianship, such as Florida Statutes Chapter 744, are the
foundation of the lawyer's duty to seek the appointment of a
guardian. Rule 1.14(b) provides:
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has
diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial
or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act
in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably
necessary protective action, including consulting with
individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to
protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
making note of the change.
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Once that step is taken, the ethical terrain becomes
treacherous indeed.
C. Who Is the Client? The Incompetent Ward or the Guardian?
Perhaps the most basic question in all of legal ethics is:
Who is the client? In the case of an incompetent ward, the
answer is clear: the client is the ward, not the guardian. 84
Because the guardian is competent and usually a close relation
of the ward, the attorney must take great care to distinguish
their respective interests.
18 5
D. May an Attorney Represent a Guardian Who Has a
Concurrent Conflict of Interest with the Interests of His or Her
Ward?
The answer to this question is an unequivocal "no."' 6 In
order to understand its significance, however, it is necessary to
describe the interests of the parties in the Schiavo case. Terri
Schiavo was the incapacitated ward, and she was supposed to be
the focus of the guardian's lawyer's duty of loyalty. In Schiavo
1,187 decided in 2001, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
had held that the difference of opinion concerning treatment
"and the inheritance issue created the appearance of conflict" of
interest between Michael, the guardian, and Terri, his ward. In
early 2005, Terri's parents renewed this charge in their "Second
Amended Petition to Remove Guardian," alleging that Michael
Schiavo, her husband and guardian, effectively controlled Terri's
representation, that he was represented by counsel throughout
the proceeding, but that she was not, and that he had personal
184 See FLA. STAT. § 765.105(1) (2007) (providing for expedited judicial review when
"[t]he surrogate or proxy's decision is not in accord with the patient's known desires or
the provisions of this chapter"); § 744.3021(3) (allowing for the appointment of "an
attorney to represent the interests of a minor at the hearing on the petition for
appointment of a guardian.").
185 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.7(o (2006) (describing conflicts of
interest). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §24 (2000).
186 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.14 (2006).
187 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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and financial interests adverse to those of Terri.8'8
A 2005 filing in the Supreme Court of the United States,
Nault v. Mainor,ls9 presented the following question for review:
"Whether a court violates due process when it appoints a
guardian ad litem who has a clear conflict of interest and when
it subsequently approves a settlement without considering the
conflict of interest between the guardian and the incompetent
person.'"190 It is somewhat surprising that there is a difference
of opinion among the courts that have considered the due
process implications of a conflict of interest between a guardian
and his or her ward. In Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, and
Washington State, the absence of an adequate guardian is a
denial of due process; but in Alabama, Florida, and Minnesota it
is not.'91 The Rules of Professional Conduct, however, leave no
doubt as to the answer to this question. Rules 1.7(a) and 1.8(g)
prohibit representation in any case involving a "concurrent
conflict of interest." '192 Rule 1.7(a) provides:
1-5 Second Amended Petition to Remove Guardian, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No.
90-2908-GD-003, at 37-50 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
189 Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308 (Nev. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 873 (2005). See
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Nault v. Mainor, 546
U.S. 873 (2005) (No. 05-82), 2005 WL 1660295.
190 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Nault v. Mainor,
546 U.S. 873 (2005) (No. 05-82), 2005 WL 1660295, at *i.
191 Compare, e.g., Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. v. Severns, 433 A.2d 1047, 1049
(Del. 1981); Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 984 P.2d 1220, 1231 (Haw. 1999); In re R.D. and
B.D., 658 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (Miss. 1995); and Cochran v. Estrada, No. 46695-0-I, 2001
Wash. App. LEXIS 364, at *4 (Feb. 26, 2001); with, e.g., In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639, 644
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding due process does not require appointment of a
guardian ad litem); In re Frederickson, 388 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 1986) (finding no
due process violation from the failure to appoint a guardian); and Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So.
2d 444, 446 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (holding due process does not require appointment of a
guardian ad litem). See also In re Pattison, 121 P.3d 423 (Kan. 2005) (suspending lawyer
who served as guardian ad litem for children from the practice of law because he had
developed a romantic relationship with their mother); and In re Guardianship of
Walther, No. 20095, 2004 WL 1454464 (Ohio Ct. App. June 25, 2004) (removing attorney
as guardian of the ward's estate because he represented the ward's son, who was serving
as the guardian of the ward's person, and took actions on the son's behalf that were
inconsistent with his duty of loyalty to the ward's estate).
192 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 and 1.8 (2006).
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(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b),[ 193] a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
Rule 1.8(g) deals directly with the "Question Presented" in
Nault v. Mainor, 19 4 and would not permit a lawyer to represent
both the guardian and the ward if there is any sort of conflict of
interest between them:
195
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each
client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.
The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature
of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of
each person in the settlement.
19 6
193 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2006). Rule 1.7(b) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id.
194 See supra text accompanying note 190.
195 Accord Carson P. ex rel. Foreman v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456 (D. Neb. 2007)
(finding attorney may serve as guardian ad litem and lawyer if there is no conflict of
interest).
196 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2006). Accord In re Black, 883 So. 2d
956 (La. 2004) (disbarring attorney for conflict between his own interests and those of
two vulnerable clients).
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E. Does Florida Statutory Law Prohibit Conflicts of Interest
Between Guardians and Wards Even If Florida Courts Refuse To
Hold As a Matter of Florida Constitutional Law That a Conflict
of Interest Between Guardian and Ward Creates a Due Process
Violation?
Notwithstanding the Florida courts' willingness to permit
conflicts of interest between guardians and wards, and, as we
shall see, conflicts of duty between judges and litigants, the
Florida Legislature has expressly forbidden such conflicts:
(b) No judge shall act as guardian after this law becomes
effective, except when he or she is related to the ward by blood,
marriage, or adoption, or has maintained a close relationship
with the ward or the ward's family, and serves without
compensation ....
(3) Disqualified persons. - No person who has been convicted
of a felony or who, from any incapacity or illness, is incapable
of discharging the duties of a guardian, or who is otherwise
unsuitable to perform the duties of a guardian, shall be
appointed to act as guardian .... The court may not appoint a
guardian in any other circumstance in which a conflict of
interest may occur.
197
VII. APPLYING THE RULES: CAN A "COLORABLE" CASE BE MADE
THAT TERRI SCHIAVO WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL IN THE
"SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT" CASE IN WHICH THE NATURE OF HER
CONDITION AND HER INTENT TO REFUSE TREATMENT WERE
LITIGATED?
It is axiomatic that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
"1198 ta hrequirement of due process, and that the adversarial nature
of common law trials requires not only that the proceeding be
fair, but also that "justice must [also] satisfy the appearance of
justice." '199
197 FLA. STAT. § 744.309(1)(b), (3) (2007) (emphasis added).
198 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
199 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (emphasis added).
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In civil or criminal cases involving severely incapacitated
individuals like Terri Schiavo, the law, the rules of legal ethics,
and simple respect for the equal rights and human dignity of the
individual require that all of the lawyers and judges involved in
the proceeding satisfy themselves that there is no bias on the
basis of "disability."2 0 It should also be apparent by this point
that any breach of ethics in the decision-making process will cast
doubt on the effectiveness of the representation, the reliability of
the fact-finding process, and the integrity of the judicial
proceeding as a whole.
Florida courts have held that Florida's explicit right to
privacy 2°1 guarantees the right of both competent and
incompetent patients to make fully informed decisions to refuse
medical treatments, including the assisted provision of food and
water.20 2 If the family members agree about the incompetent
patient's wishes, and there is no dissent, the decision to
discontinue artificial life support is a private medical decision
that needs no court oversight.20 3 If there are questions about the
oral instructions of the incapacitated person, however, or if an
interested party disagrees with the decision, "the surrogate or
proxy may choose to present the question to the court for
resolution" or "interested parties may challenge the decision of
the proxy or surrogate. 20 4  When a dispute arose between
Michael Schiavo and Terri's parents over cessation of treatment,
Robert and Mary Schindler, acting on behalf of their daughter,
presented the question to Judge Greer for review pursuant to
Florida Law.20 5
A guardianship trial that contemplates an order to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment will necessarily consider
200 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2(B)(5), (6) (2006) (requiring special attention to elimination of bias on,
among other grounds, "disability.").
20 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. See also Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and
Wales, 204, 305.1 (Bar Council 2004).
202 In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1990); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (discussing rights of competent patients).
203 FLA. STAT. §§ 765.205, 765.305, 765.306, & 765.401 (2007).
204 In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
205 Fla. Stat. § 765.401 (2007).
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the evidence concerning the patient's condition, as well as
evidence about the patient's attitudes about life and death, her
beliefs, aspirations, relationships, and fears. Effective
representation necessarily includes careful fact investigation,
presentation of credible witnesses, active cross-examination, and
presentation of direct medical evidence. Without it, the
incompetent person's right to privacy can easily fall prey to
imbalances in the relative experience, knowledge, or time
commitment of the counsel who appear in the case.
Because of the nature of the conflicting interests involved
when a family splits into warring camps in a contested
proceeding over the termination of life-sustaining treatment,
there are only two real ways to understand the dangers that
ineffective assistance of counsel can pose to the interests of the
incompetent ward. The first is to consult the voluminous case
law on "ineffective assistance of counsel" that has arisen in the
context of criminal law and procedure.2"6 The other is to
determine whether, and to what extent, it is possible under the
facts of the specific case to make a colorable assertion that there
is, in fact, a conflict of interest between the incompetent ward
and those who purport to represent their interests.
An incompetent person is, by definition, incapable of
contributing in any way to the preparation or presentation of the
case, and cannot possibly observe, or complain about, any
conflict of interest. That duty falls to others, namely, the
lawyers who seek to represent any party to the proceeding, or
the judge who must decide the case.20 7
206 See generally Right to Counsel, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 477, 496, 497
n.1558 (2008). See also Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually
Violent Predators", 93 MINN. L. REV. 670 (2008) (discussing ineffective assistance of
counsel in cases where a client is not informed of the consequences of his or her plea);
Michael S. Vastine, Is Your Client Prejudiced? Litigating Ineffective-Assistance-Of-
Counsel Claims in Immigration Matters Arising in the Eleventh Circuit, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1063 (2008).
207 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3, 4.4 (2006). MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7) (2006) ("A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law*.
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other
communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a
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Terri Schiavo did not have any legal representation in
Judge Greer's courtroom. Michael Schiavo was represented by
experienced counsel in both his individual capacity and in his
capacity as guardian. Various attorneys represented the
Schindlers during the nearly fifteen years of litigation over this
guardianship. Which of these counsel represented Terri?
The record shows that Terri was not officially noticed to
appear for the proceedings, and she was not provided with a
guardian ad litem208 assisted by legal counsel. She had no way
to confront witnesses against her, or to present her own
evidence.
Worse, the record also shows that the court considered
explicit allegations of conflict of interest between and among the
parties: specifically, disputes over inheritance and over the
proper course of treatment.20 9  Because Terri had not left an
advance directive, the first issue for the Florida courts to decide
should have been the need for a guardian ad litem who would be
represented by counsel.210 Instead, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that "there may be occasions when an inheritance
could be a reason to question a surrogate's ability to make an
objective decision." '211 As noted earlier, due to disagreement
between Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers, and an appearance
of conflict regarding the inheritance issue, the court held that
"Michael Schiavo, as the guardian of Theresa, invoked the trial
court's jurisdiction to allow the trial court to serve as the
surrogate decision-maker.
212
pending or impending proceeding....").
208 The term "guardian ad litem" is defined in section 39.820(1) of the Florida
Statutes in cases involving children as an attorney or other "responsible adult who is
appointed by the court to represent the best interests of a child in a proceeding as
provided for by law, including, but not limited to, this chapter, who is a party to any
judicial proceeding as a representative of the child, and who serves until discharged by
the court." FLA. STAT. § 39.820(1) (2007). See also FLA. PROB. R. 5.120 (2008) (providing
a similar rule for probate proceedings).
209 See infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
210 FLA. STAT. §§ 744.301, 765.105, & 765.106 (2007).
211 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001),
affd without opinion, Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001)
(emphasis added).
212 Id. (emphasis added).
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The importance of the italicized words above is not
immediately apparent, so a bit of "unpacking" is in order.
213
Both the Probate Court and the District Court of Appeal agreed
that neither Michael Schiavo nor the Schindlers could serve as
Terri's surrogate because both stood to inherit from her estate,
and there was a conflict between them regarding, among other
things, the utility of rehabilitation, the quality of medical care,
and Terri's attitudes toward cessation of life-sustaining
treatment.214  The Court of Appeal did, however, approve
Michael's request as guardian on Terri's behalf "to allow the
trial court to serve as the surrogate decision-maker." '215 This
made the problem worse, not only for the Schindlers, who
objected strenuously, but for Terri herself.
Neither Michael nor the Schindlers could serve as Terri's
surrogate. There was no guardian ad litem at this point.
Counsel for Michael and the Schindlers were also disqualified by
virtue of their respective clients' conflicting interests. Who,
then, acted on Terri's behalf? The record makes it clear that the
Probate Court itself undertook the role of "surrogate decision-
maker." As "surrogate decision-maker," Judge Greer became the
alter ego, and legal representative, of Terri Schiavo.216
This, I contend, was clearly improper.217 A judge must
serve as a dispassionate trier of fact, and may not participate as
a representative of any party.218 If the court undertakes such a
role, the trial becomes either an advisory process or an
instrument of compulsion, rather than an adversary proceeding.
This is why section 744.309(b) of the Florida Statutes expressly
213 A useful chart explaining the organization of the Florida court system can be
found on the website of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, State
Court Organization 2004, at 287, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf (last visited May 3, 2009).
214 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
216 Cf. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(d)(iii) (requiring
disqualification in any case in which a family member "within the third degree of
relationship" to either the judge or his or her spouse has anything more than a "de
minimus interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.").
217 See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 n.3 (Fla. 1989).
218 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5) (2007).
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prohibits such a conflict of roles.2 19 When a judge serves as
either the advocate or surrogate for any of the parties who have
an interest in a case pending before the court, he or she is no
longer serving as a judge. In In Re TW, the Florida Supreme
Court held that:
Under no circumstances is a trial judge permitted to argue one
side of a case as though he were a litigant in the proceedings.
The survival of our system of justice depends on the
maintenance of the judge as an independent and impartial
decisionmaker. A judge who becomes an advocate cannot claim
even the pretense of impartiality.
2 20
For the Schindlers, the judge's conflict of interest made an
already difficult case even harder to litigate. But the most
serious impact of all fell upon Terri herself. She had no
representation, legal or otherwise.
In Sandstrom v. Butterworth,221 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (which includes Florida)
recognized that an attorney's allegation that the judge has
compromised his judicial independence "are among the most
perplexing challenges that this Court encounters" and noted:
This habeas corpus appeal presents just such a challenge. It
involves one manifestation of the tension that exists between
the courts' criminal contempt power and various tenets of
constitutional due process. In the case at bar, petitioner's
conviction for criminal contempt stands in conflict with an
important principle of due process-the right to an impartial
tribunal. To uphold the state court's adjudication of contempt
would necessarily and significantly intrude upon that
fundamental due process value. Alternatively, to vindicate the
petitioner's right to an impartial tribunal would require
imposing some limitation upon courts' traditionally broad
contempt authority. Under the circumstances here, however,
the potential impairment of the court's power is outweighed by
unfairness to the petitioner. We, therefore, resolve the instant
219 See supra text accompanying note 197.
220 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190 n.3.
221 738 F.2d 1200, 1201 (llth Cir. 1984).
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conflict of values in favor of due process. 222
The Florida courts apply precisely the same rule in other
cases. In Scott v. Anderson,223 the First District Court of Appeal
noted:
The familiar axiom "a man should not be judge of his own case"
is of ancient origin, but it has apparently not yet found its way
into Florida law to the extent necessary to provide distinct
guidelines for deciding under what circumstances a judge must
disqualify himself to adjudicate direct criminal contempt
charges involving disrespect or criticism directed to that judge.
Since the question is ultimately one of federal constitutional
import, we must turn to, and be guided by the federal
decisions.
224
Because "[a]djudication before a neutral and unbiased
tribunal stands as one of the most fundamental of due process
rights [,]"225 raising questions of bias is one of the most
fundamental obligations of the first attorney to recognize the
problem. But it is no easy task. The reported cases make it
clear that charging the judge with bias during a trial can involve
some personal risk to the attorney making the charge.
Although most lawyers and judges understand that "[t]hese
are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what
constitutes justice,' 226 it is possible that some allegations of bias
will be received by the judge, or by the judge's professional
peers, as "highly personal aspersions" that 'strike 'at the most
vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament.' 227
222 Id.
223 405 So. 2d 228, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
224 Id.
225 Sandstrom, 738 F.2d at 1211.
226 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). Writing for the majority in Offutt,
Justice Douglas observed that: "The record discloses not a rare flareup, not a show of
evanescent irritation-a modicum of quick temper that must be allowed even judges. The
record is persuasive that instead of representing the impersonal authority of law, the
trial judge permitted himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner." Id. at
17.
227 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1971) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968), and distinguishing the case from Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575
(1964), in which comments to the judge did not rise to the level of a claim of bias).
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In the reported cases cited here, the attorney's assertions of
judicial bias were the basis of a contempt proceeding.
Contempt, however, is not the only personal, professional,
or political risk for charging a sitting judge with bias or conflict
of interest.228 The Schiavo case provides an excellent example of
a far more subtle and insidious constraint on a lawyer's
willingness to confront a popular judge on behalf of an
unpopular client or cause: political, social, or professional
ostracism - or discipline.2 29  A judge's unwillingness to make
hard calls in high profile cases presents an analogous
problem.23°
In the Schiavo case, the local bench and bar were clearly
invested in the "Death with Dignity" and "Judicial
Independence" narratives of the case. The Clearwater Bar
Association thought so highly of Judge Greer's "refus[al] to bend
to the intense political assault the [Schiavo] case brought [upon
him]" that it decided "[t]o celebrate [Judge] Greer's resolve" by
creating a "George W. Greer Judicial Independence Award that
would be awarded as part of its annual Law Day luncheon."
2 31
The message was not even subtle. Otherwise-legitimate
assertions of judicial bias or conflict of interest in an attempt to
ensure a fair trail for Terri Schiavo had been characterized by
228 See cases cited at notes 226 and 227 supra.
229 See generally, Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral
Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race,
Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998); Amy B.
Letourneau, Comment, Stropnicky v. Nathanson: Choosy Massachusetts Lawyers, Choose
Your Fights With Care!, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 125 (1998) (citing Richard J. Cohen, Ruling
in Discrimination Case "Must Be Opposed," MASS. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 14, 1997, at 10,
which states that criticism of the result in Stropnicky "is an absolutely predictable result
when an agency is a tool of political correctness.").
230 See James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 795 (1995); R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of
Controversy and Ideological Sentinels, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903 (1995). Cf., Stephen B.
Bright, John Randolph Tucker Lecture: Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of
Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect
Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 1 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the
Siren's Call?: Judges and Free Speech While Cases are Pending, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 815
(1995).
231 Aaron Sharockman, Lawyers Honor Schiavo Judge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
7, 2005, at 1, 2005 WLNR 7196893.
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the Clearwater Bar Association as part and parcel of an "intense
political assault" on judicial independence.
The selection of the first recipient of the "George W. Greer
Judicial Independence Award" also sent a message about
politically-correct judging. When it selected Judge W. Douglas
Baird of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court of Pinellas County,
Florida, to receive the award, the Clearwater Bar Association
conveyed a message that is as ethically stunning as it was
legally unwise.
A review of the record of Judge Baird's actions in Schiavo v.
Bush2 32 shows that he took only one action in that case that
merited the honor of being selected as the first recipient of the
"George W. Greer Judicial Independence Award.."" He entered a
summary judgment on Michael Schiavo's claim that "Terri's
Law" and the Governor's Executive Order asserting protective
custody of Terri Schiavo after Judge Greer's order to remove the
feeding tube had been executed were unconstitutional. Under
Florida law,233 the entry of summary judgment can mean only
one thing: "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file toge'ther with affidavits,
if any, conclusively show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact .... 234
This was the social and legal context in which counsel for
the Schindlers moved to have Judge Greer recuse himself,2 35 and
in which they renewed their motions to have Michael Schiavo
removed as guardian.2 36 In both cases, the allegation that Terri
232 Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2003 WL 25768817 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7,
2003) (granting summary judgment), aff'd, 871 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004),
aff'd, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, Bush v. Schiavo, 543 U.S.
1121 (2005).
233 Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) (2009).
234 Allenby & Associates, Inc. v. Crown "St. Vincent" Ltd., No. 4D08-1737, 2009 WL
1139244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2009) (emphasis added).
235 The Motion to Recuse Judge Greer was filed on April 10, 2001, and it was denied.
See Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI ETHICS PROGRAMS: SCHIAVO CASE RESOURCES, available
at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm (last accessed March 5, 2009).
236 Id. at August 10, 2001. There were several attempts to remove Michael Schiavo
as guardian. See William R. Levesque, Carrie Johnson & Anita Kumar, Without a
Ruling, the Wait Continues, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at 1A, available at
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Schiavo and her parents were litigating before a tribunal whose
process was irretrievably tainted was (and remains) supported
by material facts and law that are very much in dispute.
The Florida courts, however, had made up their minds: the
charges against Judge Greer and, by implication, the Florida
courts themselves, were baseless. The Supreme Court of the
United States addressed precisely this situation in Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, when it noted that "[n]o one so cruelly slandered
is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair
adjudication."2 37  Mayberry has been read by the Eleventh
Circuit as not "turn[ing] on proof of actual bias, but instead [it
was] centered around a 'presumption' of bias."
238
These facts, we argued, were sufficient to raise a colorable
claim that Terri had been denied a fair trial in the original
guardianship proceeding, and that she and her family were
entitled to a new trial in which both her condition and her intent
would be fully and fairly litigated. It should come as no surprise
that we failed.239 Although Congress provided in Public Law
109-3 for a trial de novo in the federal court, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida heard no
evidence. In the words of the Eleventh Circuit: "the district
court considered the federal constitutional claims de novo" by
reviewing only the "prior proceedings" in the Florida courts,
2005 WLNR 23899652.
237 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971).
238 Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1210 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing United
States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 842 (D.C. Cir.1972)).
239 Schiavo ex rel Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05CV522T30TGW, 2005 WL 2240351 (M.D.
Fla. Mar 21, 2005) (vacating the order rejecting the application of a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that "Petitioners had failed to satisfy 28 U.S.C.
§2254's requirement that Mrs. Schiavo was "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court."). After Congress adopted Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005), the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a temporary restraining
order on, among other grounds, a determination that the status quo had changed when
the feeding tube was removed pursuant to Judge Greer's order. Schiavo ex rel Schindler
v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of temporary restraining order
on the grounds that trial court's finding that parents had failed to demonstrate
substantial case on merits of their claim was not abuse of discretion); 403 F.3d 1289
(11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claims on the merits), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
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"and made its own independent evaluation of them."24
VIII. CONCLUSION
The burden of this article was not to disprove any of the
points made by either Michael Schiavo or critics of those who
sought, however unsuccessfully, to defend Terri Schiavo's
interests. Though my criticism of the defective process that led
to the final order to withdraw nutrition and hydration might be
taken to engage that question, my purpose here is far more
limited. I am more than satisfied to make the point that nobody
knows precisely what Terri Schiavo's cognitive condition was at
the moment her PEG tube was withdrawn. Though I have not
examined the record in the Eluana Englaro case, I strongly
suspect that this datum was missing in her case as well.
Armed with this information, the analogy to a capital case
is clear. All lawyers who have studied the "great writ" of habeas
corpus should be willing to concede that proceeding seeking
habeas corpus in a guardianship case would (or should) not need
to question any of the specific findings in order to state a claim
for a new trial. It need only make a showing that the process
errors in the guardianship case were so serious that the record
and the proceeding itself were tainted by a denial of due process.
Like an involuntary commitment or a capital punishment
case, the discontinuation of assisted feeding constitutes a
deprivation of life, liberty, and property interests. Unless one is
willing to assert-contrary to emerging scientific evidence-that
all persons in a persistent vegetative state have lost the ability
to respond cognitively to a variety of stimuli, advances in science
require attorneys and judges to become even more scrupulous in
their attention to the preservation of procedural due process
rights.241  The incapacitated person whose life and liberty
interests are being curtailed with state approval has "a right to
the effective assistance of counsel at all judicial proceedings
which could result in a limitation on that person's liberty."
242
240 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 403 F.3d at 1228.
241 Chalk v. Florida, 443 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
242 Id.
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Not surprisingly, the conventional wisdom that informs so
much of the post-Schiavo case commentary is (once again)
wrong. Terri Schiavo's case was never about "politicized
religious forces" or nefarious attempts by the religious right to
create a "culture war flashpoint." It was about whether a person
with a traumatic brain injury could get a fair trial in a Florida
court. Had she been a condemned criminal, the outcome-and
the tenor of the discussion-would have been very different.
And thus, this article ends with the observation with which
it began. Read together, the ethics of both law and medicine
thus lead inexorably to the conclusion that the boundary
between law and medicine is defined by the consistent
application of a rule of reason to the facts and circumstances of
each case. Because duty is our common calling, a professional
responsibility (or "duty") model provides a powerful and
precision-crafted lens through which to examine any decision,
act, or omission by a legal or medical professional.
A good lawyer investigates the facts before drawing a
conclusion, addressing the court or a witness, or making a legal
argument. A good physician, neuroscientist, or allied health
professional does precisely the same thing in the medical or
research setting. And a well-informed judge insists that both
professions do "right" by the patient whose welfare rests in their
hands. Neither profession need worry about intrusion into the
respective spheres of the other-or into the privacy rights of
patients with consciousness disorders-unless there is some
professional, ethical, or process lapse that creates probable
cause to suspect that such a violation has taken place.
There were several such violations in the Schiavo case. The
operative language of Public Law 109-3 confers jurisdiction on
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida for the sole purpose of holding a trial de novo "[f]or the
relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo." Like any trial
de novo, its outcome would turn on the facts presented at the
new trial. Like Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bolitho v. City and
Hackney Health Authority,243 Congress and the President were
243 Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Auth., [1998] A.C. 232 (H.L.).
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not bound to hold that the parties to a state court proceeding
can escape judgment for acts that were not reasonable "just
because [of] evidence from a number of medical [and legal]
experts who are genuinely [of the opinion] that the [defendants'
legal procedures,] treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound
medical [or legal] practice ....244 Whatever the opinion of the
leading experts might have been during the fifteen-year course
of the Schiavo litigation, advances in neuroscience now
demonstrate conclusively that their opinions on which the
Florida courts relied were based on incomplete, and sometimes
irrelevant, diagnostic techniques.
And so, I close this article with an admonition for both legal
and medical professionals. Ethics requires taking personal
responsibility for one's actions. Cases involving persons with
traumatic brain injuries require that lawyers, judges, and
witnesses produce a record that contains more than enough
information to withstand a charge that the injured person's
condition has been clearly and accurately stated. The record
must demonstrate that the attorneys understand the range of
medical and scientific opinion concerning the patient's
conditions and the availability of diagnostic options tailored to
that condition. In order for the case to have been fully and fairly
litigated, there must be no meaningful lapses in the pleadings,
discovery process, motions practice, trial, or appellate
procedures and briefs.
If one can do all of that, and can prove that the actions
taken are reasonable under the circumstances, there is no way
in the world that anyone could make a plausible claim that the
patient's case was tainted by an ineffective attorney or a biased
judge. The facts would speak for themselves.
244 Id. The bracketed material in the quotation indicates the author's changes from
Lord Browne-Wilkinson's original text. Although Bolitho involved only the assertion
that the court is bound by the opinions of medical experts that the specific "treatment or
diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice," Lord Browne-Wilkinson's point is, in
my view, far broader.
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